OPINION OF THE COURT

Francis Russo appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint. *159 The procedural history of this case and the details of Russo’s claims are well-known to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s thorough opinions, and need not be discussed at length. Briefly, Russo filed a complaint alleging several claims arising from the Sheriffs sale of two properties he had owned. The District Court granted the motions to dismiss filed by several defendants. After the District Court entered an order dismissing the remaining claims, Russo filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

On appeal, Russo argues that there were procedural irregularities in the Sheriffs sale of the properties. However, he already raised these arguments in his petition to set aside the sale which he filed in state court. The state court denied his petition. We agree with the District Court that Russo is not entitled to relief on these claims. Moreover, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a District Court of jurisdiction to review, directly or indirectly, a state court adjudication. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573 (3d Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has explained that this doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the District Court proceedings commenced and inviting District Court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Thus, to the extent that the relief Russo requests would require rejection of the state court’s judgments, the District Court lacked jurisdiction over those claims.

Russo also argues on appeal that his due process rights were violated by his prior counsel’s ineffective assistance. However, Russo has no right to effective counsel in a civil case. Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 1980). We agree with the District Court that Russo was not entitled to any relief under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Russo’s due process rights were not violated when a police officer and housing inspector allegedly entered the property after it was sold.

For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by the District Court, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. The motion to dismiss the appeal filed by Jack Bernard and Peter and Susanna Antipas on April 10, 2006, is denied as moot. The motion to dismiss the appeal filed by RCS Searchers is denied as moot.