OPINION

Thomas Hendrickson and other inmates incarcerated at the Delaware Correctional Center (“DCC”) filed suit against officials there under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments because inmates are prohibited from speaking during meals in the dining hall. 1 In August 2004, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed the plaintiffs’ due process claims and vicarious liability claims against former Attorney General Jane Brady as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l). The court later awarded summary judgment to the DCC officials on the rest of the claims. A handful of plaintiffs in the suit filed this timely appeal. 2

Because the appellants are proceeding in forma pauperis, we must analyze the appeal for possible dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), we must dismiss an appeal if the underlying action (i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary damages from a defendant with immunity. An appeal that lacks arguable merit should be dismissed under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

First, we agree with district court’s dismissal of appellants’ due process claims and vicarious liability claims against Brady. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a complaint must sufficiently allege a deprivation of a right secured by the constitution. See Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). Even accepting as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, see id., the appellants did not allege that they had a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Losing privileges, receiving disciplinary action and being re-classified at a certain security level do not constitute “atypical and significant hardship[s] on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). The appellants’ claim that Brady was vicariously liable for the actions of prison officials was also flawed because she did not supervise the DCC officers and employees, and she could not be held liable in a § 1983 suit based on vicarious liability theory, in any event. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-90, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 1999).

This appeal also lacks arguable merit because the district court correctly awarded summary judgment to the appel *102 lees on the remaining claims that the “no talking during meals” policy violated appellants’ constitutional rights. Under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), a prison regulation that impinges upon a prisoner’s constitutional rights is valid as long as the regulation “is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” This analysis “presupposes that the plaintiff inmate has demonstrated that a constitutionally protected interest is at stake.” Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

We agree with the analysis conducted by the district court under Turner. In light of the affidavit by Deputy Warden David Pierce, the “no talking” policy is rationally related to the DCC’s interests at stake. The other Turner factors also weigh in the appellees’ favor. 3 For similar reasons, we are satisfied that there is no Eighth Amendment violation. See Tillman v. Lebanon County Correctional Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 417-419 (3d Cir. 2000). 4

We will dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Ricky A. Whitfíeld-Bey’s motion for counsel will be denied.