OPINION OF THE COURT

Petitioner Hari Djati Intan petitions for review of a final order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.

I. Background

Petitioner Hari Djati Intan is a native and citizen of Indonesia. Intan entered the United States in April 2000 as a non-immigrant visitor and unlawfully remained longer than permitted. In February 2003, Intan applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Conven *994 tion Against Torture (“CAT”), claiming he experienced past persecution and feared future persecution in Indonesia because he is an ethnic Chinese Christian. Intan, represented by counsel, appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and conceded removability.

On August 5, 2005, after several hearings, the IJ issued an oral decision. The IJ held that Intan was not eligible for asylum because he applied more than one year after his arrival in the United States. The IJ also held that Intan failed to meet his burden of burden of proof to establish eligibility for withholding of removal or protection under the CAT. He therefore denied Intan’s applications. Intan appealed to the BIA, which issued an opinion affirming the IJ’s decision and dismissing the appeal on September 19, 2007. This timely petition for review followed.

II. Analysis

Intan’s sole argument on appeal is that he is entitled to withholding of removal. 1 To qualify for withholding of removal pursuant to INA § 241(b)(3)(A) [8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) ], Intan bore the burden of demonstrating a “clear probability” of future persecution — that “it is more likely than not” that he would be persecuted. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449-50, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). Intan claims his documentary evidence established a “pattern or practice of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant____”, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2), in Intan’s case, ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia. We review the BIA’s determination under the deferential substantial evidence standard. 2 Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). Thus, “[t]o reverse the BIA finding we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion [that Intan would more likely than not suffer persecution], but compels it.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992).

We have not conclusively addressed whether a pattern or practice of persecution of ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia exists at the present time. See Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 637 n. 10 (3d Cir. 2006). However, we have held that information in the 1999, 2003, and 2004 State Department Reports does not establish persecution sufficiently “systemic, pervasive, or organized” to constitute a pattern or practice. See Sioe Tjen Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2008); Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005). For example, the 1999 report shows that the “Indonesian government officially promotes religious and ethnic tolerance” and the interreligious violence that did arise “seem[ed] to have been primarily wrought by fellow citizens and not the result of governmental action or acquiescence.” Lie, 396 F.3d at 537. Similarly, the 2003 and 2004 reports “generally emphasize the steps taken by the Indonesian government to promote religious, racial, and ethnic tolerance and to reduce interreligious violence ... [and] indicate that private parties, not government officials, are the predominant cause of *995 harassment and violence.” Sioe Tjen Wong, 539 F.3d at 233-34. 3

Like the applicants in Lie and Sioe Tjen Wong, Intan relies on State Department Reports. While Intan relies on more recent reports — including State Department International Religious Freedom Reports for 2005 and 2006 — these reports are similar to those discussed in Lie and Sioe Tjen Wong in that they contain evidence undermining the pattern or practice claim. 4 Indeed, in Sioe Tjen Wong, we noted that recent State Department Reports actually show improved treatment of ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia. Sioe Tjen Wong, 539 F.3d at 234. Thus, the BIA could reasonably conclude that these more recent reports also do not establish a pattern or practice of persecution of ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia. Because the evidentiary record does not compel a contrary conclusion, see Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, the BIA’s decision rests upon substantial evidence. 5

III. Conclusion

The documentary evidence provided by Intan is insufficient to compel a reasonable adjudicator to conclude Intan would more likely than not be persecuted. The BIA’s ruling rests on substantial evidence, and we will therefore deny the petition for review.