OPINION

Xinwang Yang petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his motion to reopen. For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.

I.

Because we write primarily for the parties, we need not recite the factual or procedural history of this case except insofar as is helpful to our brief discussion.

Nearly three years after the BIA denied Yang’s first motion to reopen, Yang filed a second motion to reopen with the BIA based on a claim of ineffective assistance of prior counsel. On November 29, 2006, the BIA denied that motion. The BIA explained that it was denying the motion to reopen because Yang “has not explained his delay of several years after we found that he had not complied with the requirements set forth in [Matter of Lozada, su pra,] ..., and ... has not yet met the other requirements.” AR 2. The BIA also found that Yang failed to demonstrate the “due diligence” required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline. Id. It further noted that the undated, unsworn statement from Yang’s wife did not constitute “new, previously unavailable evidence to warrant reopening.” Id. Therefore, the BIA denied Yang’s motion to reopen as untimely. Id.

This petition to review the denial of his motion to reopen followed. 1

II.

Yang contends that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen. 2 Our review is limited to issues related to the BIA’s November 29, 2006 denial of his motion to reopen.

Yang’s motion to reopen is governed by 8 C.F.R. § 1008.2(c), which provides, in relevant part:

Except as provided in paragraph (c)(3) of this section, a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings (whether before the Board of the Immigration Judge) and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later.

8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Here, the “final administrative decision” was issued on October 31, 2002. There *720 fore, Yang had to move to reopen no later than 90 days from that date. Yet, his motion to reopen was not filed until almost three years later. Accordingly, it was clearly untimely. 3 However, Yang argues that ineffectiveness of prior counsel should equitably toll the filing deadline.

A substantiated claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can toll the deadline for filing motions to reopen if the alien can demonstrate due diligence. See Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 252 (3d Cir. 2005); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2000).

However, Yang’s motion neither acknowledges nor addresses the untimely nature of his August 31, 2006, filing, and nothing in this record shows that Yang could not reasonably have filed his motion to reopen well before that date.

Yang argues for the first time in his petition for review that the BIA’s refusal to toll the filing deadline due to his failure to exercise due diligence, is error “because he did not know of his right to effective assistance of counsel ... until he was advised [and] did not realize that he was [a] victim of ineffective assistance of counsel until the time of filing his Motion to Reopen.” Yang’s Br. at 19-20. He also attempts to argue that his motion to reopen is consistent with congressional intent. Id. at 20-21. However, we lack jurisdiction to consider the newly raised claims. See INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies).

III.

Thus, because Yang failed to comply with the time limitation under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) and has not demonstrated the required due diligence, 4 the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his untimely motion to reopen. Accordingly, we must deny the petition for review without addressing the merits of his claim.