OPINION OF THE COURT

Carlos Alberto Ramos Gonzalez appeals the sentence he received after pleading guilty both to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846, and to illegal reentry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2). Although he received a sentence of incarceration that is at the bottom of the advisory range set by the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Ramos Gonzalez asserts that “the sentence imposed in this case exceeded the statutory goals of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.” (Appellant’s Brief at 10.) That is his sole argument on appeal. The District Court had jurisdiction in this criminal matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

Ramos Gonzalez was part of a conspiracy responsible for bringing some 300 kilograms of cocaine from Arizona into the greater Philadelphia region. He admits that he and his brother “were in charge of obtaining and transporting the cocaine----” (Appellant’s Brief at 8.) The

District Court determined that the sentencing range called for by the Guidelines was 292 to 365 months of imprisonment, and, after a thorough discussion of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, imposed the lowest sentence in that range: Ramos Gonzalez nevertheless complains that the sentence “is excessive and does not speak to the goals of sentencing. ...” (Appellant’s Brief at 13.)

It is true that a sentencing court “may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable[,]” Gall v. United States, —

U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596-97, 169

L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and, having calculated the range, must go on to discern an appropriate sentence in light of all of the factors set forth in § 3553(a). The District Court here plainly performed the type of analysis called for by the controlling statute and precedents. We see no reason to disagree and, in any event, are bound to recognize that “[t]he sentencing judge has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant before him than ... [does] the appeals court.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597-98. We therefore reject Ramos Gonzalez’s argument that we substitute our judgment for that of the sentencing judge.

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment and sentence imposed by the District Court.