OPINION

Appellant, John E. Felgar, appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint. For the following reasons, we will affirm.

I.

In 1997, Felgar pleaded guilty to charges in Jefferson County, Pennsylvania of aggravated assault and driving under the influence of alcohol. The trial court sentenced him to a term of 2-4 years’ imprisonment, with a maximum sentence date of November 11, 2001. In June 2000, Felgar was released on parole.

The following year, while he was on parole, Felgar was arrested for physically assaulting his girlfriend and threatening to kill her. Because the arrest violated the terms of his parole, Felgar was returned to prison to serve out the remainder of his sentence. On November 11, 2001, when he reached the maximum sentence date for his 1997 offenses, Felgar was turned over to police on a detainer issued for the 2001 incident with his girlfriend. Felgar was then charged with simple assault, terroristic threats, and reckless endangerment.

On August 22, 2002, Felgar appeared before Jefferson County Common Pleas Court Judge Foradora and entered into a negotiated plea agreement on these charges. Specifically, Felgar pleaded guilty to simple assault and terroristic threats, and the Commonwealth agreed to nolle pros the reckless endangerment charge. The parties agreed that Felgar would serve 6-24 months’ imprisonment on the simple assault charge, but that he would be required to serve only five years’ probation on the terroristic threats charge. After the hearing, Judge Foradora signed two orders to impose these sentences: one for the simple assault sentence, and one for the suspended sentence on the terroristic threats charge. It appears, however, that, due to a clerical error, the captions on both of the orders read “simple assault.” Therefore, on August 26, 2002 Judge Foradora issued an “Order Correcting Written Sentence Order of August 22, 2002.” As the District Court explained, *109 this amended order only compounded the confusion; rather than correcting the caption of the order reflecting the suspended sentence for terroristic threats, the order changed the caption on the other order. 1 As a result, the charges on the sentencing orders were reversed. On August 29, 2002, Felgar began serving his sentence at the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 2

In November 2002, Felgar filed a petition pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541, et seq., in the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County alleging that his sentence was illegal because it failed to comply with the terms of Judge Forado-ra’s orders. The court denied the petition, and the Superior Court affirmed.

Next, in July 2004, Felgar filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania raising several challenges to his sentence. The District Court denied the petition, and this Court denied his application for a certificate of appealability-

Felgar ultimately served the maximum 24-month term of imprisonment on the simple assault conviction, plus an additional twelve months of back time on the parole revocation sentence. Felgar was released from prison on October 10, 2005. 3

II.

On October 5, 2007, Felgar filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §' 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in which he essentially alleged that he is being unlawfully confined due to the confusion surrounding his August 26, 2003 amended sentencing order. 4 Felgar claims that he should have been released on probation immediately after his sentencing hearing because, “whether the label being simple assault or whether it being terroristic threats, the [August 26, 2002 amended order] specifically states that the sentence is suspended and The Defendant be placed on Probation for 5 (five) years.” (Am. Compl.lfl! 53-54.) Felgar argues that the DOC Defendants have violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to release him “despite their knowledge of a court order suspending [his] sentence of incarceration and placing him on [five years’] probation.” (Am.ComplA 101.) Felgar also claimed that the AG Defendants had violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by attempting to conceal his wrongful commitment, and that various members of the Jefferson County District Attorney’s office were negligent. 5 (Am.Compl.lffl 80- *110 81). Felgar sought declaratory and in-junctive relief as well as monetary damages.

Both the DOC and AG Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge who recommended that the District Court dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court agreed, and, by order entered September 15, 2008, dismissed the Amended Complaint on the ground that the matter was frivolous and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This appeal followed. 7

III.

Upon review, we conclude that the District Court’s dismissal of the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was proper. 8 It is well-settled that; when, as in this case, a state prisoner is challenging the fact or duration of his confinement, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus, not a § 1983 action. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); Williams v. Consovoy 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006). In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court held that, when success in a § 1983 action would implicitly call into question the validity of a conviction or the duration of a sentence, the plaintiff must achieve a favorable result through available state or federal challenges to the underlying conviction or sentence before he may proceed under § 1983. Considering Heck and summarizing the interplay between habeas and § 1983 claims, the Supreme Court recently explained that:

[A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) — no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceed ings) — if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the confinement or its duration.

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005) (emphasis in original).

Thus, the threshold inquiry in determining whether § 1983 is a proper vehicle for Felgar’s complaint is whether success in this § 1983 action would “necessarily demonstrate” the invalidity of his sentence. We answer this question in the affirmative because success on Felgar’s claims against the DOC and AG Defendants — i.e., a finding that the defendants violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by confining him in violation of the terms of Judge Foradora’s August 26, 2002 amended sentencing order — would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his sentence. Accordingly, because the state sentence has not been overturned or otherwise rendered invalid, Felgar may not attack it via a § 1983 action, and the District Court’s dismissal of his claims was proper. 9

*111 IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the District Court’s decision to dismiss the Amended Complaint was proper. Accordingly, as there is no substantial question presented by this appeal, we will summarily affirm. See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Felgar’s motion for appointment of counsel and his motion for sanctions are denied. 10