OPINION

Barbara Burns, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the District Court remanding an action filed against her to New Jersey state court. Burns also has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition seeking to compel the District Court to entertain the action, which she removed from state court. The appeal and petition have been consolidated for disposition. Because we lack jurisdiction to review the District Court’s remand order, we will dismiss both Burns’s appeal and her petition.

The Estate of Renee A. DeFina, through its executor, filed an action against Burns in New Jersey state court to determine the parties’ interests in a condominium. The Estate sought the discharge of a lis pen-dens that Burns had filed against the title to the property. The Estate also sought an order directing Burns to remove her personal property from the condominium. Burns removed the action to District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) based on diversity jurisdiction. The District Court remanded the action to state court, concluding that Burns had not established diversity jurisdiction. Burns filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied. Although Burns asserted that she lived in Minnesota, the District Court found that Burns had established a domicile in New Jersey, the same state of citizenship as the Estate. Burns appealed and also filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition seeking review of the remand order.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the district court shall remand a case removed from state court if at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Section 1447(d) bars review of remand orders that are made under § 1447(c) and invoke the grounds specified therein, unless the order remanded the case to the state court from which it was removed pursuant to 28 *108 U.S.C. § 1443. Feidt v. Owens Corning Fiberglas

Corp., 153 F.3d 124, 126 (3d Cir. 1998). 1 This bar applies not only to direct appeals of such orders, but also to petitions for writs of mandamus or prohibition seeking review of a remand order. Thermtron Products Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976), abrogated on other grounds, Quackenbush v. Allstate Inc. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996); Feidt, 153 F.3d at 126.

Here, the District Court’s remand order was based on its lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We are thus precluded from reviewing the order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Although Burns asserts in her response to possible dismissal of her appeal that the District Court’s order is reviewable because she removed the state court action pursuant to the civil rights provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1443, 2 her notice of removal states that she removed the action pursuant to § 1441(a) based on diversity of citizenship. In addition, Burns did not seek to invoke the District Court’s original jurisdiction over a civil rights claim. See Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 784 (3d Cir. 1995).

Accordingly, we will dismiss Burns’s appeal and her petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition for lack of jurisdiction. 3