OPINION OF THE COURT

Ossie R. Trader, a federal prisoner, petitions this Court pro se, seeking a writ of mandamus directed at the Clerk and Deputy Clerks of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.

In 1994, Trader and two associates were arrested on charges of armed bank robbery, conspiracy, and related crimes. Trader entered a plea of not guilty and, through counsel, began preparing for trial. Among other things, Trader filed several motions: a motion to compel pre-trial discovery, a motion claiming the violation of his right to a speedy trial, and a motion for severance. See Docket Nos. 34, 40, 42. In *204 June 1995, after a change of plea hearing, Trader changed his plea to guilty. See Docket Nos. 47, 48. The District Court accepted the guilty plea, scheduled a sentencing hearing, and sentenced Trader to a term of 248 months of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. In January 1998, two and a half years after Trader entered his guilty plea, the District Court Clerk administratively terminated Trader’s motions. 1

In his mandamus petition, Trader argues that the Clerk of the District Court lacked the power to terminate the motions, absent an express “order, Judgment, or decree” by the District Court. Trader seeks an order directing the Clerk to delete the docket entry, as well as an order prohibiting the Clerk from violating the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 951, the statute setting forth the oath of the office of clerks and deputies.

Mandamus is a drastic remedy granted only in extraordinary cases. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). To prevail, a petitioner must establish that he has a “clear and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ, and “no other adequate means” to obtain relief. Id. at 378-79. Trader cannot establish a “clear and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ.

The management of its docket is committed to the sound discretion of the District Court. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982). We will not interfere with that discretion except upon the clearest showing that the District Court’s action substantially prejudiced the litigant. See id. Here, Trader cannot show that he was prejudiced when the Clerk, acting for the District Court, made a docket entry administratively terminating Trader’s motions.

“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). Trader waived his speedy trial claim by entering his guilty plea. See Washington v. Sobina, 475 F.3d 162, 166 and n. 5 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). He also waived his constitutional right to a jury trial, see United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 607 (3d Cir. 1973); without a trial, Trader’s motions for pre-trial discovery and for severance became moot. Thus, because he waived the right to pursue the relief he sought by his motions, Trader suffered no prejudice when the Clerk of the District Court made a docket entry administratively terminating them.

Trader has made at least three previous attempts to reinstate his speedy trial claim by seeking mandamus in this Court. See 285 Fed.Appx. 973 (3d Cir. 2008); 226 Fed.Appx. 100 (3d Cir. 2007); 161 Fed.Appx. 205 (3d Cir. 2006). As we have repeatedly informed Trader, the speedy trial motion was terminated due to his guilty plea. If he wishes to challenge his guilty plea, he may not do so in a petition for a writ of mandamus.

*205 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. 2