OPINION

Pursuant to the terms of a written plea agreement, William D. Edgar waived his right to an indictment and pleaded guilty to a three-count information in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The information charged Edgar with a conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. The charges were based on Edgar’s participation in a scheme to defraud federally insured financial institutions by submitting materially false statements in mortgage loan applications. The plea agreement contained a broad waiver of Edgar’s right to appeal his conviction or sentence. In addition, the agreement set forth stipulations by the parties regarding the calculation of Edgar’s offense level based on the amount of the loss, his role in the offense, and his acceptance of responsibility. At sentencing, after noting the applicable stipulations, the District Court determined that Edgar’s offense level was 21 and that his criminal history score was I, yielding a sentencing guidelines range of 37 to 46 months. At the conclusion of the sentenc *94 ing proceeding, the District Court imposed, inter alia, concurrent sentences of 37 months of imprisonment on each count.

Edgar appealed. 1 He contends that the District Court abused its discretion because it failed to adequately consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and to grant a downward variance. In a second argument Edgar asserts that the Court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a downward departure or variance on the basis that the stipulated amount of loss overstated the actual loss. The government invokes the appellate waiver contained in the plea agreement and submits that it should be enforced. In the alternative, the government asserts that Edgar’s arguments lack merit.

The issues that Edgar raises on appeal fall within the scope of the appellate waiver. Because Edgar acknowledges that his appellate waiver was knowing and voluntary, we consider “whether enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 244 (3d Cir. 2008). Edgar acknowledges that his sentencing guideline was correctly calculated and that his sentence is within the guideline range. Nonetheless, he contends that the waiver should be set aside because the District Court’s failure to give any meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors constitutes a miscarriage of justice. According to Edgar, the Court merely listed the § 3553(a) factors and did not explain the weight it accorded the evidence Edgar adduced to mitigate his sentence.

In United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2001), we declined to invalidate appeal waivers based on any particular legal or factual claim, choosing instead to consider several factors in deciding whether to vacate an otherwise valid waiver. Id. at 563 (endorsing the approach in United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2001)). Central to this inquiry is whether the District Court erred. We find no error. It is clear from a review of the record before us that the District Court did more than simply list the factors. It specifically noted the circumstances Edgar cited in support of a downward variance. It chose, however, after noting, inter alia, the ongoing nature of the offenses, the elaborate scheme used to defraud the mortgage brokers, the significant loss Edgar caused to several institutions, and the seriousness of the offenses, to impose a sentence at the bottom of the sentencing guidelines. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no basis for setting aside the valid appellate waiver and we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 2