OPINION

Astolfo Torres, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Torres is presently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at Fort D ix, New Jersey. He pleaded guilty in 2004 to various crimes relating to the distribution of cocaine in the Southern District of Florida and was sentenced to 108 months’ incarceration. His direct appeal to the Eleventh Circuit was dismissed as untimely, and his subsequent motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, was denied on its merits. In 2008, Torres filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the District of New Jersey, where he is confined. That petition, which attacked his conviction and sentence, was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Torres v. Grondolsky, No. 1:08-cv-4811 (D.N.J. 2008). Torres did not appeal.

In September 2010, Torres initiated this case by filing another § 2241 petition. In it he averred that he is actually innocent because, under the Supreme Court’s recent decision, Padilla v. Kentucky, — U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1486, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to inform him that a guilty plea carries a risk of deportation. The District Court construed his petition as a second or successive § 2255 motion, and dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction. See Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971). Torres appealed. 1

A motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the primary means to collaterally challenge a federal conviction or sentence. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997). A federal prisoner can seek relief from an unconstitutional sentence or conviction under § 2241 if the remedy provided by § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002). We have held that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective where an intervening change in substantive law has potentially made the conduct for which the petitioner was convicted non-criminal. Dorsainvil, *101 119 F.3d at 248. Even assuming, arguendo, that Padilla is retroactively applicable on collateral review, that case does not represent a change in substantive law. The conduct for which Torres was convicted remains criminal and his claim of “actual innocence” is otherwise unsubstantiated. His claims should therefore have been raised via a § 2255 motion in the Southern District of Florida, his court of conviction, and not in the District of New Jersey. 2 See Galante, 437 F.2d at 1165; 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Accordingly, the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Torres’ petition, and correctly dismissed the action.

Accordingly, we conclude that Torres’ appeal presents no substantial question, and will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 & I.O.P. 10.6. The petition for a certificate of appealability is denied as unnecessary.