OPINION

Pro se appellant Michael Sigmon appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint. 1 We have jurisdiction pur *88 suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). For the reasons discussed below, we will summarily vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

On May 13, 2011, Sigmon filed a pro se complaint along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The complaint, although lacking certain essential information, appears to raise a state law claim of medical malpractice against Johns Hopkins Hospital. 2 Sigmon apparently litigated this claim before a state administrative agency in Maryland and, after receiving an adverse judgment, filed a federal complaint.

The District Court granted Sigmon’s request to proceed IFP but dismissed the complaint, stating that “his allegations ‘amount to nothing more than vague, con-clusory assertions’ which are insufficient to state a claim for relief.” Op. at 1 (quoting Foster v. Raleigh, 445 Fed.Appx. 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 2011)). Sigmon then filed this appeal.

We agree with the District Court that, as drafted, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. To avoid dismissal, a complaint’s “[fjactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The complaint “must not be ‘so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by [Fed.R.Civ.P. 8].’ ” Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). Sigmon’s complaint fails to state, for instance, who committed malpractice, when the malpractice occurred, what precisely happened, or how he was injured. Therefore, we discern no error in the District Court’s conclusion that the complaint is deficient.

Nevertheless, prior to dismissing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e), a district court must give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleading to cure the defect unless such an amendment would be futile or prejudicial. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, the District Court did not address whether an amendment would be appropriate; we have recognized that, in cases like this one, where a complaint is subject to dismissal “ ‘for a lack of factual specificity, [plaintiff] should be given a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect, if he can, by amendment of the complaint.’ ” Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Darr v. Wolfe, 767 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1985)). Thus, while we express no view as to whether Sigmon will ultimately plead a meritorious claim, we conclude that the District Court erred in dismissing the complaint without providing leave to amend. 3

We will therefore summarily vacate the District Court’s order dismissing the case *89 and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.