OPINION

Terrell Brown, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

I.

Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and complex procedural history of this case, we will recite them only as necessary to our analysis. Terrell Brown has an extensive criminal history; three of his convictions are presently relevant. In 1993, Brown pleaded guilty in Oklahoma to possession of a dangerous substance — crack cocaine— with intent to distribute, and was sentenced to five years imprisonment. The following year Brown pleaded guilty in Wisconsin to second-degree reckless homicide in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1). That conviction related to a 1992 incident during which Brown approached a car in front of his home and shot at it multiple times, killing its occupant. While he was on parole for that offense, he was arrested in Chicago, Illinois, for attempting to deliver approximately half of a kilogram of crack cocaine to a dealer from Gary, Indiana. He was charged in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana with attempting to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. In light of his Oklahoma and Wisconsin convictions, Brown was sentenced as a career offender to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. United States v. Howard, 341 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2003). 1 In June 2004, the District Court denied Brown’s motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Howard v. United States, No. 3:03-cv-651 (N.D.Ind. 2004), and the Seventh Circuit denied his request for a certificate of appealability, Brown v. United States, No. 04-3114 (7th Cir. 2005).

In April 2011, Brown filed in the Seventh Circuit an application to file a second *221 or successive § 2255 motion in which he sought to claim that his prior conviction for reckless homicide should not have been considered a crime of violence in light of Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008), and United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2009), and that his sentence as a career offender was therefore in error. The Seventh Circuit denied Brown’s application, concluding that Begay does not constitute a new rule of constitutional law. However, the Court dismissed the application “without prejudice to any attempt by Brown to obtain relief under Begay in an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Brown v. United States, No. 11-1893 (7th Cir. 2011). Brown, who was at that time incarcerated at FCI Fort Dix, thereafter filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 in the District Court for the District of New Jersey. The District Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review Brown’s application and dismissed it on that basis. Brown v. Zickefoose, No. 11-3330, 2011 WL 5007829 (D.N.J. 2011). Brown timely appealed. 2

II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (certificate of appeala-bility not required to appeal from denial of § 2241 petition), abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 641, 649, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012). We “may affirm the District Court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record.” Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

III.

The Government presently seeks to enforce the appellate waiver contained in Brown’s guilty plea agreement, under which he agreed “not to contest [his] sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any post-conviction proceeding, including, but not limited to, a proceeding under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255.” Amended Pet’n to Enter a Change of Plea at 4. 3 We will enforce waivers of constitutional and statutory rights “provided that they are entered into knowingly and voluntarily and their enforcement does not work a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 2008).

First, Brown’s plea was knowing and voluntary. As the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana explained, he was informed of the elements of the charges against him and the penalties he could face, and he indicated that he had not been coerced into pleading by force or threat. Howard, No. 3:03-cv-651. The Seventh Circuit similarly concluded in his direct appeal that Brown “was clearly informed about dire possibilities” and “it is not possible to say that he was blindsided” by the sentence he received. Howard, 341 F.3d at 622.

*222 Nor would enforcing the waiver work a miscarriage of justice. The miscarriage of justice exception applies in only “unusual circumstance[s]” such as where a sentence was “ ‘imposed in excess of the maximum penalty provide[d] by law or ... based on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as race.’ ” United States v. Khattak, 273 F.Bd 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2000)). No such circumstances are present here. See Mabry, 536 F.3d at 243 (finding no miscarriage of justice where defendant was not misled and challenges to waiver “d[id] not implicate fundamental rights or constitutional principles”).

IV.

We will enforce the waiver and affirm the dismissal of Brown’s habeas application on that basis.