OPINION

Anthony White, Jr. appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress a handgun found on his person. Though we differ in our reasoning, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 1

I.

The District Court concluded that White was “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes upon the officers’ initial approach, but that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop White based on Davis’s conduct. To its credit, and in the best tradition of government service, 2 the government now concedes there was no reasonable suspicion to stop White simply because he was walking next to Davis, whom officers reasonably suspected was *230 violating the law. 3 Thus, the remaining issue is whether White was “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes when the officers initially approached the three men. If that encounter did not amount to a seizure, then the gun need not be suppressed even though the officers had no reason to suspect that White was engaging in unlawful conduct when they initially approached the three men.

In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court explained that a seizure occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). “Although a brief investigatory stop is considered a ‘seizure,’ not every encounter between the police and a citizen constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Williams, 413 F.3d 347, 352 (3d Cir. 2005). Where, as here, “the actions of the police do not show an unambiguous intent to restrain or when an individual’s submission to a show of governmental authority takes the form of passive acquiescence,” we apply an objective test: “a seizure occurs if ‘in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)).

Here, after hearing testimony from Detectives Love and Gault, and defendants White and Davis, the District Court credited the officers’ testimonies and found the defendants’ testimonies not credible. Although the District Court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, the District Court erred in concluding as a matter of law that White was seized when the officers initially approached the three men. Police “do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street ... [and] asking him to answer some questions.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); United States v. Crandell, 554 F.3d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 2009); Williams, 413 F.3d at 354. “Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870). 4 Accordingly, without more, the *231 circumstances here do not constitute a seizure. 5

II.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the government, it is clear under the Supreme Court’s precedent that the earliest White could have been seized was when Detective Love ordered him to remove his hands from his pocket. By then, however, for the reasons stated by the District Court, Detective Love had reasonable suspicion to believe White was armed. Detective Love therefore acted within the limits of Terry in seizing the disputed gun from White.

III.

For the reasons we have explained, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.