OPINION

Allen Feingold, a former attorney appearing pro se, appeals the dismissal of a third-party complaint filed by the executrix of an estate that Feingold represented against Liberty Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”). Feingold also appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion for recusal. We will affirm.

I. Background

Feingold sued Barbara Quinn, the executrix of the estate of decedent Theresa Thompson, seeking to recover over $75,000 in attorney’s fees allegedly owed for his prior representation of Thompson. Quinn then impleaded Liberty Mutual under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, believing that the insurance company could indemnify the estate. 1 Fein-gold asserted no claims against Liberty Mutual. Liberty Mutual filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court granted, ruling that no relevant indemnification agreement existed between the decedent and Liberty *280 Mutual and that, under Pennsylvania law, third-party contribution is inapplicable to contract disputes.

Feingold then proceeded to a bench trial on his claim against Quinn, although he introduced no evidence and called no witnesses. The Court accordingly entered judgment in favor of Quinn on Feingold’s claims. Notably, two days before trial began, Feingold filed a motion for recusal, which the Court summarily denied as untimely and without merit.

Feingold has appealed, although he does not argue for review of the entry of judgment in favor of Quinn. 2 Instead, he takes issue with the dismissal of Quinn’s third-party complaint against Liberty Mutual, which Quinn herself has not appealed, and he further attacks the denial of his motion to recuse.

II. Discussion 3

Feingold’s appeal is meritless. 4 Assuming he properly appealed the order dismissing the third-party complaint — an assumption that may be doubted, given ambiguities in his Notice of Appeal — he lacks standing to do so. Although he attempts to establish standing by including a third-party-beneficiary argument in his brief, he never asserted a claim against the insurance company in his complaint. He was in no manner aggrieved by the dismissal, as he retained his claims against Quinn and even proceeded to trial on them. See, e.g., Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Sebelius, 674 F.3d 139, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2012) (“To establish standing ..., a plaintiff has the burden of establishing ‘an injury in fact’: a harm that is both concrete and particularized, either actual or imminent, and not conjectural or hypothetical.”). Therefore, he has no standing to appeal the dismissal of Quinn’s third-party complaint. But even if he did have standing, and further assuming that the District Court erred in dismissing the third-party complaint, the adverse judgment that was ultimately rendered against him on his underlying claim renders any such decision harmless.

*281 Regarding Feingold’s motion to recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, the Court did not commit an abuse of discretion in denying it for two reasons. First, as the motion relates to 28 U.S.C. § 144, it was untimely. He waited until practically the eve of trial to file the motion, providing no justification for his tardiness. See Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 88, 86 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Neither can [the judicial process] tolerate the practice of waiting until the eve of trial and then resorting to a § 144 affidavit in order to obtain an adjournment.”). As the motion relates to § 455, he only points to Judge Bartle’s adverse rulings against him in this case and others. But adverse rulings alone are almost never proper grounds for recusal, and the rulings here are no exception. See, e.g., United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 218 (3d Cir. 2007) (“ ‘[Rulings and orders] can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required ... when no extrajudicial source is involved. Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.’ ” (second alteration in original) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994))).

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.