OPINION

Keith Honaker appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss his criminal complaint. Finding no error, we affirm the District Court. 2

I.

A grand jury indicted Honaker for knowingly failing to register as required *930 by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Honaker was required to register as a result of committing a sex offense several decades before the enactment of SORNA in 2006. However, pursuant to the authority delegated to him under the statute, the Attorney General has promulgated rules making SORNA applicable to those who committed pre-enactment sex offenses. See 73 Fed.Reg. 38030-01, 38035-36 (July 2, 2008).

Honaker moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that SORNA violated the nondelegati on doctrine by delegating to the Attorney General the authority to determine the applicability of SORNA to offenders, such as Honaker, who were convicted of a sex offense before SORNA was enacted. The District Court denied that motion. See United States v. Honaker, 2012 WL 2952367 (W.D.Pa. July 19, 2012). Honaker then entered into a conditional plea agreement, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The District Court sentenced Honaker to 30 months’ incarceration, to be followed by a life-time term of supervised release.

Honaker now appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss that indictment. On appeal, his sole argument is that Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine when it delegated to the Attorney General the authority to determine the applicability of SORNA’s registration requirements to pre-SORNA sex offenders.

While Honaker’s appeal was pending, we decided United States v. Cooper, 750 F.3d 263, 2014 WL 1386816 (3d Cir. Jan. 8, 2014), in which we squarely held that “SORNA does not violate the nondelegation doctrine,” id. at 264, 2014 WL 1386816, at *1. Because Cooper is directly on point, we are bound by its holding. See Chester ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Grane Healthcare Co., 666 F.3d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Under our Internal Operating Procedures, a panel of this Court cannot overrule an earlier binding panel decision; only the entire court sitting en banc can do so.” (citing Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.1)). Accordingly, we reject Honaker’s contention that SORNA violates the nondelegation doctrine by delegating authority to the Attorney General to determine the applicability of SORNA’s registration requirements to pre-SORNA sex offenders.

II.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s denial of Honaker’s motion to dismiss.