OPINION **

The Estate of Albert P. Schultz (the “Estate”) seeks review of two District Court orders, which like the underlying dispute itself—a disability discrimination case involving the United States Postal Service that dates back to the 1990s1— have a somewhat tangled procedural history. Before reaching the merits of the Es-fate’s appeal, we determine whether we have appellate jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, we do not. As a result, the appeal will be dismissed.

Greatly condensed, the cases on appeal began as two attorneys’ fees proceedings brought by the Estate before the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Merit Board”), an agency that serves as an “independent adjudicator of federal employment disputes.”2 After the first case (“Schultz /”) ended in a loss, the Estate both petitioned for judicial review and filed the second fee case before the Merit Board (“Schultz II”)—which, in turn, also ended in a loss and in another petition for review.3 After some false starts, both petitions for review ended up before Judge Fischer in the Western District of Pennsylvania under separate docket numbers.

The Merit Board, named as a defendant on each docket, moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) to consolidate the two cases, which it described as “really the same case.”4 The Merit Board also asked to be dismissed as an improper defendant. In an order entered on each docket, Judge Fischer consolidated the cases, dismissing/closing Schultz II and directing all further filings to be made on Schultz I. In the same order, Judge Fischer -denied a motion to remand filed by the Estate and dismissed the Merit Board as a defendant *850from both cases.5 The consolidated Schultz I was then assigned to Judge Bloch. A reconsideration motion filed on both dockets was denied separately by Judge Bloch on Schultz I and Judge Fischer on the now-closed Schultz II. The Estate then filed a notice of appeal in Schultz II.6

Before turning to the appeal proper, we address one more relevant part of the proceedings before the District Court. Eight days after the Estate appealed Schultz II, Judge Bloch ruled on several motions in Schultz I that had been filed prior to the consolidation. Significantly, Judge Bloch granted the Estate’s cross motion for summary judgment “to the extent that it seeks remand to the [Merit] Board for a determination of attorney fees incurred in connection with [the Estate’s] underlying compliance action.”7 The case was, as- a result, remanded to the Merit Board for further proceedings.

The Estate’s appeal presents a two-part appellate jurisdiction question, which we “resolve ... before reaching the merits.”8 We first determine whether Judge Fischer’s order was initially appealable. If it was not, we decide whether intervening developments in the case affected its appealability.

We conclude that Judge Fischer’s order was not appealable when it was originally issued. “In general, we may only hear appeals from final judgments and from certain prescribed interlocutory orders of the district courts.”9 A decision is final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 when it ends the case as to all claims and all parties.10 While Judge Fischer’s order dismissed the Merit Board “with prejudice” as an improper defendant, the claims against it remained lodged against the Postmaster General in the consolidated Schultz /; the District Court continued to adjudicate the remaining claims and otherwise to take action in the case.11 And in the absence of *851finality, “[a]n order granting or denying consolidation is a nonappealable interlocutory order.”12

There is one more avenue by which we might have jurisdiction. In this Circuit, the Cape May Greene rule allows for a prematurely filed appeal to “ripen upon the court’s disposal of the remaining claims.”13 Assuming without deciding that Judge Bloch’s Schultz I decision resolved the rest of the case, we have held that Cape May Greene “is not applicable to discovery or similar interlocutory orders.”14 Judge' Fischer’s order contained both interlocutory and dispositive elements, but is challenged only with regard to the former, not the latter. The Estate does not contend that the Merit Board was a proper defendant for reasons unrelated to its concern about the full scope of the consolidation. Thus, Cape May Greene would not cause the notice of appeal to ripen.

In sum, we conclude that Judge Fischer’s order was not appealable, and has not become so due to intervening events. It follows that the orders denying reconsideration were also not appealable. Because we lack jurisdiction, the appeal will be dismissed.