Taylor Mendez v. Warden Lewisburg USP
Taylor Mendez v. Warden Lewisburg USP
Opinion
BLD-055 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 19-2070 ___________
TAYLOR MENDEZ, Appellant
v.
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1:19-cv-00428) District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo ____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 November 26, 2019
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, Jr., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 6, 2019)
___________ OPINION * ___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM
Federal inmate Taylor Mendez filed a habeas petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2241challenging a prison-imposed restriction on his visitation privileges. Concluding that
Mendez could not pursue his claim under § 2241, the District Court entered an order
dismissing the habeas petition without prejudice to Mendez’s refiling the action as a civil
rights matter. See DC Op. at 4 (“[Mendez] seeks injunctive relief in the form of an Order
directing the BOP to allow him visitation with his girlfriend. As such, Mendez’s petition
does not challenge the duration and lawfulness of his confinement, which is the proper
use of § 2241 petition.”). Mendez appealed.
We have appellate jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Cf. Welch v. Folsom,
925 F.2d 666, 668(3d Cir. 1991). Because the District Court decided this matter correctly,
see Velazquez v. Superintendent Fayette SCI,
937 F.3d 151, 158(3d Cir. 2019)
(acknowledging Circuit precedent holding “that a petitioner who seeks habeas relief for
claims that do not qualify as attacking the fact, duration, or execution of a sentence may
not maintain the suit as a habeas action”), we will affirm, see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 (2011);
3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6 (2018). 1
1 This is not a case where the inmate-plaintiff simply mislabeled his initial filing; Mendez’s form-of-action selection was purposeful. See § 2241 Pet. at 1. Under the circumstances, we do not take issue with the District Court’s dismissing the so-called habeas petition without prejudice instead of, for example, offering Mendez the opportunity to replead. Cf. Royce v. Hahn,
151 F.3d 116, 118(3d Cir. 1998).
2
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished