United States v. Francis Brooks
United States v. Francis Brooks
Opinion
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________
No. 17-3764
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
FRANCIS BROOKS, Appellant ___________
Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands (District Court No. 3-10-cr-00036-002) District Judge: Hon. Curtis V. Gomez ______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) December 10, 2019 ______________
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: January 15, 2020) _______________________
OPINION* ___________________ McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Francis Brooks appeals his judgment of sentence, arguing that the District Court
abused its discretion by denying him a downward departure from the applicable Sentencing
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Guidelines range and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.1 Because the District
Court understood but declined to exercise its authority to depart from the Guidelines, we
will dismiss Brooks’ appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction 2, and because his sentence is
substantively reasonable, we will affirm the judgment of sentence.3
I.
We review criminal sentences for both procedural error and substantive
reasonableness.4 While Brooks concedes his sentencing was procedurally fair, he argues
that the District Court’s denial of his request for a downward departure resulted in a
substantively unreasonable sentence.5 We review the reasonableness of a sentence for
abuse of discretion.6 We determine whether the District Court “gave ‘meaningful
consideration’ to the sentencing factors set out in § 3553(a),” and if so, “we give
1 App. Br. at 21. 2 United States v. Lofink,
564 F.3d 232, 240(3d Cir. 2009) (“we are not at liberty to review a discretionary denial.”). 3 The District Court of the Virgin Islands had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3241. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 4 United States v. Hester,
910 F.3d 78, 90-91(3d Cir. 2018). 5 If the District Court denies a request for a downward departure based on a belief that a departure was legally impermissible based on the grounds proffered, we have jurisdiction to review and determine whether the District Court’s understanding of the law was correct. United States v. Stevens,
223 F.3d 239, 247(3d Cir. 2000). However, when a District Court understands its authority to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines but exercises discretion not to do so, we lack jurisdiction to review such discretionary denials. Lofink,
564 F.3d at 240; see also United States v. Jackson,
467 F.3d 834, 839(3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]s it was pre-Booker, courts of appeals post-Booker, have no authority to review discretionary denials of departure motions in calculating sentencing ranges.”). Because the District Court understood its authority to depart from the suggested Guidelines range and rejected Brooks’ motion on the merits, we will dismiss Brooks’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction in so far as he suggests the District Court abused its discretion by denying him a downward departure. 6 Hester,
910 F.3d at 90-91. 2 deference to its discretion in choosing the ultimate sentence. Our review is accordingly
limited to determining whether the district judge imposed the sentence he or she did for
reasons that are logical and consistent with the factors set forth in section 3553(a).”7
Reasonableness review “is highly deferential, and we will affirm unless no reasonable
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence…for the reasons the district
court provided.”8
The District Court considered the appropriate section 3553(a) factors in the
context of Brooks’ case. The District Court considered the seriousness of the offense,
stating “this is a case that involved law enforcement officers engaging in a breach of their
sworn duty and engaging in conduct that involved racketeering and a number of other
things, that at the very least reflected a conflict of interest with their sworn duties, but
significantly involved substantive criminal acts.”9 The District Court also considered the
need to “deter this type of conduct, protect the community from this type of
conduct…and also impose a sentence that will be no more severe than is necessary to
achieve the objectives of the Sentencing Commission.”10 Finally, the District Court
imposed a sentence to “achieve parity with similarly-situated individuals, and…to ensure
that the defendant[], to the extent necessary, receive[s] such medical treatment, mental
7 United States v. Jimenez,
513 F.3d 62, 90(3d Cir. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 8 United States v. Gillette,
738 F.3d 63, 79(3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 9 JA64. 10 JA64. 3 health therapy, educational opportunities, training opportunities as are appropriate under
the circumstances.”11
Furthermore, Brooks’ health condition and family responsibilities do not make his
sentence substantively unreasonable.12 The District Court considered and reasonably
rejected Brooks’ arguments that his health complications related to his brain tumors and
the symptoms of HIV made the conditions of confinement inhumane because there was
no showing that the confinement would cause his condition to worsen nor that the Board
of Prisons was unable to provide Brooks necessary medical care.13 Likewise, the District
Court found Brooks’ argument that he needed to care for minor children inconsistent with
his debilitating medical condition, explaining that “the extraordinary physical impairment
to which the defendant refers is one that certainly undercuts the support of – or family
responsibilities that the defendant also seeks a downward departure for.”14
Thus, Brooks has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that no reasonable
court would have imposed the same sentence on him for the reasons provided by the
District Court. The District Court imposed a reasonable sentence in light of the relevant
factors under section 3553(a). We find no abuse of discretion in the decision of the
District Court.
III.
11 JA64-65. 12 Because we lack jurisdiction to review the District Court’s discretionary decision to deny Brooks’ request for a downward departure, we review only whether his circumstances make his sentence substantively unreasonable. 13 JA50. 14 JA49-50. 4 For the reasons stated above, we will dismiss Brooks’ appeal for lack of
jurisdiction in part and affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence.
5
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished