In re: Frederick Banks v.
In re: Frederick Banks v.
Opinion
ALD-112 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-3830 ___________
IN RE: FREDERICK BANKS, Petitioner ____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (Related to Cr. No. 2-15-cr-00168-001) ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. February 6, 2020 Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 2, 2020) _________
OPINION * _________
PER CURIAM
On November 7, 2019, pro se petitioner Frederick Banks was convicted in the
District Court of numerous counts of wire fraud and aggravated identify theft. The
District Court scheduled sentencing for April 17, 2020. Meanwhile, Banks, a prolific
filer, has inundated the District Court and this Court with filings. Currently before the
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Court is his petition for a writ of mandamus, in which he asks us to order the District
Court to “set [a] prompt sentencing date.” Pet. at 1.
We will deny the petition. Our review of the docket reveals that the District Court
has been promptly ruling on Banks’s stream of motions, has ordered the probation office
to prepare a presentence investigation report, and has scheduled a sentencing hearing. So
to the extent that Banks seeks a definite sentencing date, a sentencing hearing has been
scheduled. To the extent that he requests an expedited sentencing date, he has not made
the requisite showing that his right to relief is “clear and indisputable,” Hollingsworth v.
Perry,
558 U.S. 183, 190(2010) (per curiam), or that the delay in his case is “tantamount
to a failure to exercise jurisdiction,” Madden v. Myers,
102 F.3d 74, 79(3d Cir. 1996);
see generally United States v. Campisi,
583 F.2d 692, 693–94 (3d Cir. 1978) (five-month
delay between guilty plea and sentence was not “unreasonable” within the meaning of
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)).
Accordingly, we will deny Banks’s mandamus petition.
2
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished