NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 19-2621 ________________

ALLEN L. FEINGOLD,

Appellant

v.

PALMER & BARR; THERESA MOGAVERO SIMMONS; JOHN MCGRATH; STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, AKA State Farm; STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, AKA State Farm; STATE FARM AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, AKA State Farm; STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, AKA State Farm; STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, AKA State Farm; THOMAS DELEVIE; BARBARA J. LYONS; BCMAC; WALTER S. JENKINS; MARK S. KARDOS; JOHN BARR

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-04991) District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg ________________

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) On January 24, 2020

Before: AMBRO, MATEY and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 24, 2020) OPINION *

ROTH, Circuit Judge

Allen Feingold—previously disbarred lawyer, 1 currently pro se plaintiff—sued

State Farm Insurance Company, naming its counsel and arbitrators as additional

defendants, asserting a claim of bad faith under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371. The claim arose from

an underinsured motorist action of Feingold’s former client, Dawn McAteer, who assigned

her bad faith insurance claim to Feingold. All defendants filed motions to dismiss and the

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted them. 2 We will affirm the

order of the District Court.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to

and we have

jurisdiction under

. Our review is plenary. Finkelman v. National

Football League,

(3d Cir. 2016).

Statutory permission is required to assign bad faith claims. As the District Court

found, Feingold has none. 3 According to Feingold, bad faith claims are freely assignable

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 Feingold was first suspended from the practice of law in Pennsylvania for three years on March 3, 2006, and again for two years, consecutive to the earlier suspension, on August 26, 2006. He was disbarred on August 28, 2008. Feingold v. Graff,

, 226 n.3 (3d Cir. 2013). We have affirmed dismissals of Feingold’s previous attempts to circumvent his inability to practice law in similar pro se actions. See Feingold v. Liberty Mut. Grp.,

(3d Cir. 2014). 2 See Feingold v. Palmer & Barr, No. 2:18-CV-04991-MSG,

, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 2019). 3 See Feingold,

, at *3. 2 pursuant to Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Wolfe. 4 But Feingold’s

reliance on Wolfe is misplaced. Wolfe does not extend permission to assign bad faith claims

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371 beyond assignments “to an injured plaintiff and judgment

creditor.” 5 Feingold was neither. Therefore, as the District Court correctly held, without

a valid assignment, Feingold lacks standing to bring a bad faith suit. 6

If that were not enough, Feingold is a disbarred attorney who is prohibited from

having any contact with previous clients. 7 As the District Court deduced, Feingold could

not have obtained a signed contract from McAteer without having had any contact with

her. 8 Thus, even if McAteer’s assignment were recognized under Pennsylvania law,

enforcing it would violate public policy.

4

(Pa. 2014). 5

. As the District Court helpfully explained:

In Wolfe, the insured of the defendant insurance company assigned his claim to the victim of an accident caused by the insured’s drunk driving. Following a jury verdict in favor of the assignee-victim, the insurance company appealed, arguing that the assignee lacked standing because the assignment of the bad faith claim was impermissible. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit certified the issue regarding the validity of the assignment to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the assignment in that case was valid, but expressly limited assignments of bad faith claims to “an injured plaintiff and judgment creditor.”

Feingold,

, at *3 (citations omitted). 6 Feingold,

, at *5. 7 Pa.R.D.E. 217(j)(4)(v) (prohibiting formerly admitted attorneys from “having any contact with clients either in person, by telephone, or in writing, except [for certain ministerial matters]”). 8 Feingold,

, at *4. 3 Feingold argues there is no actual evidence of contact. But the contract itself is the

evidence. It stretches the imagination to believe Feingold could have procured a signed

contract from McAteer, assigning her bad faith claim to him, absent any contact between

them. Construing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the non-moving party—

which Feingold suggests the District Court erred in not doing—does not require us to

assume the impossible.

III

Without a valid assignment of a claim of bad faith, Feingold lacks standing. We

will affirm the District Court’s order, dismissing Feingold’s claim.

4