Roy Bordamonte v. Hector Lora
Roy Bordamonte v. Hector Lora
Opinion
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT __________
No. 20-3415 __________
ROY BORDAMONTE, Appellant v.
HECTOR LORA, Individually and in their official capacities; LUIS GUZMAN, Individually and in their official capacities; GARY SCHAER, Individually and in their official capacities; ALEX BLANCO, Individually and in their official capacities; RALPH DANNA, Individually and in their official capacities; CARLOS FIGUEROA; CITY OF PASSAIC, a Municipal Corporation
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-17-cv-02642) District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini ________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 27, 2021
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 30, 2021)
___________ OPINION * ___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Roy Bordamonte, a police officer with the City of Passaic, sued the City and six of
its officials and employees alleging that he suffered unlawful retaliation at work for
supporting the losing candidate in the City’s mayoral election. The District Court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on all counts and dismissed the case with
prejudice. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the District Court’s decision.
I.
Bordamonte was a member of the City’s Police Department from 1994 until his
retirement as a Sergeant in 2019. Between 2015 and 2016, he was the Commanding
Officer of its Quality of Life (“QOL”) Unit. In the fall of 2016, defendant Alex Blanco,
the City’s then-mayor, pleaded guilty to federal bribery charges and later resigned.
Around the same time, defendant Luis Guzman became the Police Chief. Guzman
disbanded the QOL Unit and transferred the officers in it, including Bordamonte. At his
request, he began a night shift under the command of defendant Ralph Danna. In this
new role, Bordamonte alleges that Danna harassed and mistreated him, including by
interfering with his use of vacation days.
Bordamonte contends that all these actions—the dissolution of the QOL Unit, his
transfer to the patrol shift, and Danna’s mistreatment of him—were in retaliation for his
support of Richard Diaz for mayor, who lost the race to defendant Hector Lora. 1 He sued
1 Bordamonte also contends that, as part of an internal investigation, he was asked to give false testimony against Diaz in violation of New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act. Bordamonte does not challenge the District Court’s grant of summary judgment as to this claim in his opening brief. 2 the City, Blanco, Guzman, Danna, Lora, as well as Gary Schaer, a member of the City
Council, and Carlos Figueroa, a Lieutenant in the Police Department, under
42 U.S.C. § 1983and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, for violating his First Amendment rights. The
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants and dismissed the
lawsuit with prejudice. Bordamonte appeals to us.
II.
Our review on appeal is plenary, which means we review the motions for
summary judgment anew, applying the same standard as the District Court. See Blunt v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist.,
767 F.3d 247, 265(3d Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is
appropriate if, after viewing the underlying facts “in the light most favorable to
[Bordamonte],”
id.(internal quotation marks omitted), “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a).
We agree with the District Court that Bordamonte failed to identify genuine issues
for trial that would allow a jury to render a verdict in his favor. “To establish a First
Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee must show that (1) his speech is
protected by the First Amendment and (2) the speech was a substantial or motivating
factor in the alleged retaliatory action, which, if both are proved, shifts the burden to the
employer to prove that (3) the same action would have been taken even if the speech had
not occurred.” Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist.,
805 F.3d 454, 466(3d Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Here, Bordamonte failed to show that his support for Diaz was a substantial or
motivating factor in his alleged mistreatment at work. The dissolution of the QOL Unit
cannot be traced to Bordamonte’s political speech or association. Indeed, the entire Unit
was dissolved and he was not singled out, making it unlikely that it was his particular
political activity that triggered the dissolution. In fact, the record is clear that there are
several other possible causes—unrelated to Bordamonte’s political activity—for the
Unit’s dissolution and his reassignment. Importantly, Guzman and the Prosecutor’s
Office both expressed concern about the QOL Unit’s tactics. Indeed “the Prosecutor’s
Office recommended [its] dissolution.” Further, contrary to Bordamonte’s belief that he
is the “Michael Jordan” of police officers, App. at 255, he had a troubled relationship
with the community he served, having been caught on video telling minority residents
that he is “gonna have immigration pick everybody up so they can cross back to the
fucking border in Puebla or wherever the fuck [they] came from,” App. at 287; cf. State v.
Camey,
217 A.3d 106, 119–20 (N.J. 2019) (the New Jersey Supreme Court criticizing
Bordamonte’s failure to obtain a search warrant in a 2013 investigation). And finally,
although Bordamonte complained that Danna interfered with his use of vacation days, it
is not apparent what adversity that caused at all because he was able to use all his
vacation days while under Danna’s command.
In sum, we agree with the District Court that Bordamonte’s belief he was
retaliated against due to his support of a political candidate “never [rose] above
speculation.” App. at 8. On appeal, Bordamonte continues to grasp at straws, pointing to
internal inconsistencies in the defendants’ testimony about the political drama that
4 embroiled the City. But none of these arguments touch the issue at hand—whether
Bordamonte’s support for Diaz was a substantial or motivating factor in his alleged
mistreatment at work. 2 We thus hold that Bordamonte failed to establish this required
element of causation.
* * * * *
Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment
in favor of the defendants.
2 Bordamonte also challenges the District Court’s refusal to accept certifications from him and Diaz. We see no error with the Court’s decision. It struck the certifications because the signature pages did not comply with court rules. Although Bordamonte was given an opportunity to fix the error, he re-filed the same certifications. App. at 7, n.2. The Court thus concluded these certifications were both “untimely and improper,” but in any event they did “not contain facts establishing genuine issues of material fact.”
Id.Moreover, the Court also concluded that the rejected certifications did “not contain facts establishing genuine issues of material fact;” so even if they had been accepted, it would not have changed the disposition of this case.
Id.5
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished