Kenth Rogers v. Director Internal Revenue Bure
Kenth Rogers v. Director Internal Revenue Bure
Opinion
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 19-1642 _______________________
KENTH ROGERS, Appellant
v.
DIRECTOR INTERNAL REVENUE BUREAU; GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS _______________________
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands District Court No. 1-14-cv-00008 District Judge: The Honorable Anne E. Thompson __________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1 (a) December 9, 2021
Before: McKEE, RESTREPO, and SMITH Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 21, 2021) __________________________
OPINION* __________________________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Kenth Rogers—a lawyer proceeding pro se—appeals the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment to the Director of the Virgin Islands Internal Revenue Bureau. Because
Rogers presents no meritorious grounds for reversal, we will affirm.
Rogers failed to file his tax returns on time in 1994, 1995, 1999, 2003, and 2004.
As a result, he owed taxes, and the Virgin Islands put a lien on his house and levied his
bank account. Rogers sued the Government alleging that its actions violated
26 U.S.C. §§ 7432, 7433. The case originally proceeded before Magistrate Judge George Cannon and
District Judge Wilma Lewis. Eventually, Magistrate Judge Cannon recused himself, and
the case was transferred to District Judge Anne E. Thompson.
On appeal, Rogers argues that: (1) the Court erred in dismissing his claims for
failure to exhaust; (2) the Court erred in crediting certain evidence that demonstrated his
tax liability; (3) the Government perpetrated fraud on the Court; (4) Magistrate Judge
Cannon’s alleged bias violated Rogers’s rights under the Due Process Clause; and (5) the
Court erred when it dismissed older summary judgment motions as moot. We will take
each argument in turn.1
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to
48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) and
28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. For all issues, our standard of review is de novo. In re Shenango Grp. Inc.,
501 F.3d 338, 344–45 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that plenary review applies to legal questions); Herring v. United States,
424 F.3d 384, 389–90 (3d Cir. 2005) (fraud); Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund,
12 F.3d 1292, 1297 (3d Cir. 1993) (summary judgment). 2 Rogers failed to exhaust his claim. Before suing under § 7432 and § 7433, the
individual must direct an administrative claim to the relevant district director.
26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7432–1(f), 301.7433–1(e).2 The claim must include certain information such as the
grounds for the claim and the dollar amount requested. § 301.7432–1(f)(2). Rogers argues
that he was not required to follow that procedure because it is not “on the books” or, in the
alternative, he talked to a tax official about his claim. First, this requirement is “on the
books,” and Rogers fails to explain why these provisions would not apply in the Virgin
Islands. Second, we have consistently construed the exhaustion requirement strictly. See,
e.g., Venen v. United States,
38 F.3d 100, 103–04 (3d Cir. 1994), abrogated on other
grounds by Hassen v. Gov’t of V.I.,
861 F.3d 108(3d Cir. 1997) (dismissing claim for
failure to exhaust when individual sent letter to the wrong official). Providing actual notice
to the relevant agency is not sufficient to prove exhaustion. Id. at 103. Because Rogers
did not direct his claim with the relevant information to the correct official, the Court
appropriately held that Rogers’ claim should be dismissed for failure to exhaust.
Even if Rogers had exhausted his claim, the District Court went on to correctly
determine that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that Rogers owed taxes. Rogers
argued that the Court should have shifted the burden to prove his tax liability to the
Government because he produced sufficient evidence demonstrating that he paid his taxes.
Not so. In fact, the evidence presented by Rogers alone demonstrated that he paid less than
2 The Virgin Islands tax code “mirrors” the United States tax code.
48 U.S.C. § 1397; Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Gov’t of V.I.,
300 F.3d 320, 322(3d Cir. 2002). The parties do not identify any material differences between the United States code and the Virgin Islands code. 3 what he owed. Rogers quibbles that the District Court cited an unsworn memorandum
from a tax official to determine Rogers’ liability, but that memorandum was just a summary
of a sworn affidavit. As such, it was not improper for the District Court to consider the
memorandum on summary judgment.
Furthermore, there is no evidence of fraud on the Court. Rogers claims that the
memorandum referenced above is fraudulent, but he has presented no evidence that would
meet the “demanding standard” required to prove fraud. See Herring,
424 F.3d at 390. He
also claims that the Government fraudulently asserted that he had to exhaust remedies. But
the Government’s representation was accurate. He did have to exhaust his remedies before
filing suit, and he failed to do so.
The last two issues fail because even if they are errors,3 they are clearly harmless
errors. We will not vacate a judgment for an error that does not affect an individual’s
substantial rights. Gen. Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc.,
263 F.3d 296, 328–29
(3d Cir. 2001). Rogers states that Magistrate Judge Cannon was biased and denied him an
opportunity for discovery that would have helped his case. But Magistrate Judge Cannon
recused himself and Rogers had the opportunity to conduct discovery for a full year under
the supervision of a new magistrate judge. Additionally, Judge Thompson may have
denied older pending motions for summary judgment, but Rogers did not identify any
3 We do not reach the question as to whether these rulings are erroneous. 4 argument that he could not have raised in the eventually ruled upon motion for summary
judgment.4
Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
4 Appellant’s Motion to Include Administrative Material in the Joint Appendix will be denied. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 27 and 30 do not give us the power to compel any further discovery, and the requested documents are not relevant to the proper outcome of this case. 5
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished