Palani Karupaiyan v. L. Naganda

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 21-2560 __________ PALANI KARUPAIYAN; P. P.; R. P. v. L. NAGANDA, individually and in his official capacity as Owner of Naga Law Firm; NAGA LAW FIRM; J. RAMYA; P. JAYABALAN; J. RANJEETHKUMAR; ARUL THIRUMURUGU; ATLANTIC REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP AND MIDDLESEX MANAGEMENT; MIDDLESEX MANAGEMENT INC; OAK TREE VILLAGE; DAVID HALPERN, individually and in his official capacity as CEO, Owner of Atlantic Realty Development Corp, Middlesex Management, Oak Tree Village; D&G TOWING; GLENN STRAUBE, individually and in his official capacity as owner of D&G Towing; COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; TOWNSHIP OF EDISON PALANI KARUPAIYAN, Appellant ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-12356) District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) December 22, 2021 Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: February 3, 2022) ___________ OPINION*

County of Middlesex filed a reply. (ECF 36.) Karupaiyan also filed a motion for a permanent injunction, seemingly alleging corruption in New Jersey’s judicial appointment system. (ECF 38.) The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the amended complaint “fails to provide a clear narrative of either the factual or legal basis for [Karupaiyan’s] claims.” (ECF 44 & 45.) In its order, the District Court stated that further amendment of the complaint would be futile. (ECF 45.) The District Court also denied Karupaiyan’s motion for a permanent injunction. Karupaiyan filed a notice of appeal (ECF 46), which he later amended.1 (ECF 48.)

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292(a)(1). We review the District Court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 8 for an abuse of discretion. In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1996). We also review the denial of a motion for a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion, which “exists where the District Court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.’” Citizens Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d 110, 126 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting A.C.L.U. of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1476 (3d Cir. 1996)).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Each averment must be “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). “Taken together,” Rules 8(a) and 8(d)(1) “underscore the emphasis placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading rules.” In re: Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1996). A complaint must “‘be presented with clarity sufficient to avoid requiring a district court or opposing party to forever sift through its pages in search’ of the nature of the plaintiff’s claim[.]” Glover v. FDIC, 698 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir. 1990)).

We construe pro se filings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and “are more forgiving of pro se litigants for filing relatively unorganized or somewhat lengthy complaints.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019). Nevertheless, we conclude that Karupaiyan’s amended complaint failed to comply with Rule 8. The amended complaint consisted of 337-pages and 1449 separately numbered paragraphs, plus a single-spaced 60-paragraph, eight-page prayer for relief. He identified approximately 30 defendants and cited over 50 laws as bases for relief. The prolix amended complaint, however, failed to explain how those defendants violated his rights under those laws. Instead, Karupaiyan provided a disjointed factual narrative that included descriptions of, among other things, a stolen bicycle, divorce proceedings, a landlord-tenant dispute, alleged corruption in the New Jersey judicial system, and incidents of domestic violence. That narrative was unconnected to any potential claims or purported grounds for liability. And, notably, the amended complaint was filed after Karupaiyan’s original pleading had been dismissed based on Rule 8 deficiencies. Cf. Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that courts have power to dismiss a “prolix complaint” without leave to amend where such leave “has previously been given and the successive pleadings remain prolix and unintelligible”). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Karupaiyan’s amended complaint without leave to amend for failure to comply with Rule 8.2 See Garrett v, 938 F.3d at 92 (stating that “the question before us is not whether we might have chosen a more lenient course than dismissal … but rather whether the District Court abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal”).

The District Court also did not abuse its discretion in denying Karupaiyan’s motion for a permanent injunction, which seemingly sought to prevent the appointment of justices to the New Jersey Supreme Court. Karupaiyan vaguely asserted that “court packing” “discriminate[s] and violate[s] the civil rights, equal employment opportunities, [and results in] age discrimination ….” (ECF 38, at 2.) These allegations, however, fail to set forth with any specificity how Karupaiyan would be irreparably injured by the denial of injunctive relief or how banning the appointment of state supreme court justices would not result in greater harm to the nonmoving parties. See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussion factors to consider in deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction).

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.3