United States v. Zaamar Stevenson

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ________________ No. 21-1225 ________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ZAAMAR STEVENSON Appellant _____________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 2:16-cr-00189) District Judge: Honorable Nora Barry Fischer ________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1 on January 28, 2022 Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, MCKEE and MATEY, Circuit Judges (Filed: March 21, 2022) ________________ OPINION* MATEY, Circuit Judge Appellant Zaamar Stevenson appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion for a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Finding no error, we will affirm.

I.

Stevenson was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment for drug distribution in September 2020. (App. at 3.) As the District Court explained, the “sentence reflected a significant variance below the advisory guideline range of 292 to 365 months,” in light of Stevenson’s “physical ailments, including asthma and hypertension, his post-offence rehabilitation efforts, as well as the impact that the COVID-19 pandemic had on incarcerated individuals.” (App. at 3–4.)

Less than two months after his sentencing hearing, Stevenson filed a motion for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). (App. at 4.) The District Court denied the motion, explaining that “all of the mitigation evidence raised in Defendant’s motion was adequately accounted for at his sentencing a few months ago.” (App. at 9.) This appeal timely followed and we will affirm.1 II.

The First Step Act permits granting a motion for compassionate release where “the sentence reduction is (1) warranted by ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’; (2) ‘consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission’; and (3) supported by the traditional sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they are applicable.” United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing § 3582(c)(1)(A)). Stevenson has not satisfied these requirements.2 Stevenson first argues his health conditions (including asthma, hypertension, and obesity) place him at increased risk for COVID-19 complications. But as the District Court explained, Stevenson’s health is “generally normal.” (App. at 6.) “Moreover, neither [Appellant]’s asthma nor his hypertension is listed by the CDC as presenting a severe risk of complications from COVID-19.” (App. at 6.) Nor has Stevenson shown he is receiving inadequate care. (App. at 6.) Because “the mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release,” the District Court did not abuse its discretion. United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020).

Stevenson also argues the District Court erred in considering as binding the policy statements of the Sentencing Commission. After the District Court’s decision in this case, we held in Andrews that the policy statement interpreting “extraordinary and compelling reasons” does not apply to inmate-initiated motions for compassionate release and therefore does not bind the District Court on such motions. 12 F.4th at 259 & n.4. But we also explained that the policy statement may still inform the meaning of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” The District Court’s consideration of the policy statement as a guide therefore was not error. Id. at 260. Finally, the District Court appropriately considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors.3 Seeing no “clear error of judgment,” we will not disturb the District Court’s conclusions. Id. at 259 (quoting United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020)).

II.

Because “[c]ourts wield considerable discretion in compassionate-release cases,” Andrews, 12 F.4th at 262, and we cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion in denying relief, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Appellant’s motion.