ELD-003 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 22-3053 ___________

IN RE: MARK MAZZA; LISA MAZZA, Petitioners ____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Related to E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2-17-cv-05453) District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno ___________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. December 21, 2022 Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 9, 2023) _________

OPINION * _________

PER CURIAM

Mark and Lisa Mazza, proceeding pro se, petition for a writ of mandamus

compelling District Judge Eduardo C. Robreno to recuse himself from presiding over an

ejectment action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pennsylvania. They also seek a writ compelling the District Court to reassign the case to

another District Judge pursuant to the court’s local rules and to provide them an

opportunity to conduct discovery. On December 5, 2022, petitioner Mark Mazza filed for

Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania. The act of filing triggers the automatic stay provisions of

.

See In re School Asbestos Litig.,

(3d Cir. 1990); Assoc. of St. Croix

Condo. Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corp.,

, 448-49 (3d Cir. 1982).

Accordingly, we will stay the proceeding as to Mark Mazza. For the reasons discussed

below, we will deny the mandamus petition as to Lisa Mazza. See Maritime Elec. Co.,

Inc. v. United Jersey Bank,

(3d Cir. 1991) (noting that “the

automatic stay is not available to non-bankrupt co-defendants of a debtor even if they are

in a similar legal or factual nexus with the debtor”).

In 2017, petitioners’ home was purchased at a Sheriff’s sale by the Bank of New

York Mellon (“BNYM”). Petitioners subsequently refused to vacate the property, which

prompted BNYM to file an ejectment action in the Chester County Court of Common

Pleas. Petitioners then removed the case to the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where the matter was assigned to District Judge Petrese

B. Tucker. During the litigation of that case, petitioners filed an action against BNYM

and other entities in the District Court, alleging, inter alia, that BNYM acquired title to

their property by fraudulent means. The case was assigned to District Judge Eduardo C.

Robreno. In July 2022, BNYM’s ejectment action was reassigned to Judge Robreno

upon Judge Tucker’s assumption of inactive status.

2 On September 18, 2022, petitioners filed a motion for Judge Robreno’s recusal or

disqualification from the ejectment action pursuant to

, 455. Petitioners

claimed that opposing counsel’s disclosure to the court during a conference call in the

fraud action that Mr. Mazza was a former attorney impugned the Mazzas’ credibility and

created a high probability that Judge Robreno would investigate court and disciplinary

records. They also alleged that disparaging statements made by BNYM’s counsel in

filings in the fraud action warranted recusal. The District Court denied the motion. It

also denied petitioners’ motion to reassign the ejectment case pursuant to the court’s local

rules. Petitioners then filed this mandamus petition.

Our jurisdiction derives from

, which grants us the power to

“issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of [our jurisdiction] and agreeable to the

usages and principles of law.” A writ of mandamus is an extreme remedy that is properly

invoked only in extraordinary situations. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court,

(1976). A petitioner seeking the writ “must have no other adequate means to

obtain the desired relief, and must show that the right to issuance is clear and

indisputable.” Madden v. Myers,

(3d Cir. 1996), superseded in part on

other grounds by 3d Cir. L.A.R. 24.1(c) (1997).

Mandamus is a proper means to obtain review of the denial of a recusal motion

filed pursuant to

. Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc.,

(3d Cir. 1993). Under § 455(a), recusal is required when a “reasonable person, with

knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably

be questioned.” In re Kensington Int’l Ltd.,

(3d Cir. 2004). In this

3 regard, “[w]e have repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not

form an adequate basis for recusal.” Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc.,

(3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Additionally, “opinions formed by

the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current

proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality

motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair

judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States,

(1994). Moreover,

recusal is not required on the basis of “unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous

speculation.” In re United States,

(1st Cir. 1981).

Here, Lisa Mazza has not made a persuasive case for mandamus relief. Her

allegations that Judge Robreno harbored hostility toward her and Mr. Mazza are based on

the unsupported speculation that (1) Judge Robreno looked into why Mr. Mazza was no

longer an attorney and (2) opposing counsel’s allegedly disparaging comments about

where the Mazzas were residing and their litigation strategy had prejudiced the court. 1

The only evidence that Mrs. Mazza identifies as demonstrating such hostility or prejudice

are the court’s legal rulings, which “alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias

or partiality motion.” Liteky,

. She has not alleged any judicial remarks

indicating a “high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment

impossible.”

Nor is the administrative reassignment of her case to Judge Robreno

indicative of any potential bias. Thus, Mrs. Mazza has not established that a reasonable

1 In their mandamus petition, petitioners state that Mr. Mazza has been disbarred. 4 person would question the District Court’s impartiality, and she is accordingly not

entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering recusal.

To the extent that Mrs. Mazza seeks to compel the District Court to allow her to

conduct discovery before the filing of summary judgment motions in the ejectment

action, she is not entitled to mandamus relief because she can challenge any denial of

discovery on appeal from a final order of the court. See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd.,

(3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that where “in effect, an appeal will lie,

mandamus will not”); see also Madden,

. The same is true for the court’s

denial of her motion to reassign the ejectment action pursuant to the court’s local rules.

See U.S. v. Eleven Vehicles, Their Equip. and Accessories,

(3d Cir.

2000) (reviewing a District Court’s departure from its own local rules on direct appeal

from a final order).

Accordingly, we will deny the petition as to Lisa Mazza and stay the petition as to

Mark Mazza. Mark Mazza shall notify this Court when the automatic stay is no longer in

effect.

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