NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________

No. 22-1512 _______________

ARIE OREN, Appellant

v.

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; JOHN E. WETZEL, Secretary of Department of Corrections; LAUREL R. HARRY, Superintendent of SCI-Camp Hill; SERGEANT RIVERA, Correctional Officer SCI-Camp Hill; LAGOVINO, Unknown staff member SCI-Camp Hill _______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 3:20-cv-02451) Magistrate Judge: Joseph F. Saporito, Jr. _______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a): January 18, 2023 _______________

Before: AMBRO, PORTER, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: January 19, 2023) ______________

OPINION ∗ ______________

∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. PORTER, Circuit Judge.

Arie Oren was an inmate at SCI-Camp Hill in Pennsylvania from 2013 to 2019

before being deported to Israel. He sued the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and

four of its officials (“Defendants”) under

for depriving him of his

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. A magistrate judge properly dismissed these

claims, so we will affirm.

I

The parties consented to jurisdiction before Magistrate Judge Saporito.

(c)(1). The Court had federal-question jurisdiction under

. We

have jurisdiction over its final order under

(c)(3) and 1291. Jones v.

Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transp. Crew,

, 481 (3d Cir. 2019).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain factual allegations that,

if accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6). We review a District Court’s order granting a

motion to dismiss de novo. Chang v. Child.’s Advoc. Ctr. of Del. Weih Steve Chang,

(3d Cir. 2019).

II

According to Oren, in March 2019, prison officials searched the cell that he shared

with another inmate. The officials discovered a cell phone and placed Oren in

administrative custody pending investigation. One month later, Oren was notified that he

2 was no longer under investigation but would remain in administrative custody due to

safety concerns. After a stay of 123 days in administrative custody, Oren was paroled on

July 30, 2019, and transferred to immigration detention. He was deported in April 2020.

Oren says that the Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights against cruel

and unusual punishment by unjustifiably placing him in administrative custody. He

concedes that the initial stay of 30 days was permissible for investigative reasons but

challenges the remaining 93 days. “To prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment, an

inmate must show that he has been deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.” Griffin v. Vaughn,

(3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Oren correctly states this rule but provides no supporting

allegations. And we have made clear that, standing alone, placement in administrative

custody is not cruel and unusual punishment.

So the magistrate judge correctly

dismissed this claim.

Oren also argues that the Defendants violated his due process rights by not

explaining why he remained in administrative custody after the investigation into the cell

phone incident concluded. To secure the protection of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must assert a protected life, liberty, or property

interest. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Meachum v. Fano,

(1976). “As

long as the conditions or degree of confinement . . . is not otherwise violative of the

Constitution,” inmates do not have a protected interest in serving their sentence at a

particular prison or custody status. Montayne v. Haymes,

(1976). So

3 Oren’s due process claim never gets off the ground, and the magistrate judge properly

dismissed it.

After the magistrate judge dismissed his claims, Oren asked for leave to amend his

complaint. In civil rights cases, trial courts are required to grant such leave unless it

would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,

(3d

Cir. 2002). The magistrate judge correctly concluded that an amendment would be futile

because, in addition to the shortcomings discussed above, Oren failed to assert that any

individual defendants were personally involved in his administrative custody. The Court

considered Oren’s supplemental submissions aimed at establishing personal involvement

and found them unpersuasive. We review a denial of leave to amend for an abuse of

discretion.

We find none here.

III

For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court.

4