NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________

No. 22-1958 _______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

TELWIN VINCENT Appellant _______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 2-21-cr-00567-001) District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler _______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on January 24, 2023.

Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and MATEY, Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 31, 2023) _______________

OPINION* _______________

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Telwin Vincent challenges the reasonableness of the 41-month sentence he received

after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and conspiracy to use

unauthorized access devices. We discern no error and will affirm.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. I. DISCUSSION1

Vincent contests both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.

A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court applies the appropriate

enhancements and deductions under the Sentencing Guidelines, considers any motions for

departure, and weighs the sentencing factors under

(a). See United States

v. Seibert,

(3d Cir. 2020). A procedurally reasonable sentence is also

substantively reasonable unless “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the

same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”

United States v. Shah,

, 367 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Tomko,

(3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)).

According to Vincent, his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the

Government misinformed the District Court that he was ineligible for a sentence of

noncustodial probation. But Vincent was indeed ineligible for probation. He pleaded

guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, a crime punishable by up to 30 years’

imprisonment.

, 1349. An offense punishable by a maximum term of

imprisonment of 25 years or more is a Class B felony.

§ 3559(a)(2). By statute, a court

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under

. We have appellate jurisdiction under

and

(a). In reviewing a sentence, we defer to the district court’s factual findings “and reverse only for clear error” but consider legal rulings de novo. United States v. Bierley,

(3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Because Vincent did not raise procedural objections to his sentence below, we assess the procedural reasonableness of his sentence for plain error. United States v. Flores-Mejia,

(3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). We review the substantive reasonableness of his sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pawlowski,

(3d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

2 cannot sentence a defendant to probation for a Class B felony.

§ 3561(a)(1).

Next, Vincent contends the Government misinformed the District Court that the

Guidelines range was mandatory, thereby rendering Vincent’s sentence procedurally

unreasonable. That assertion is inaccurate. The Government explicitly apprised the Court

of its duty to exercise discretion in sentencing Vincent.

In a final procedural challenge, Vincent argues that the District Court failed to

adequately consider his personal history and caregiving role for his mother. But the Court

specifically acknowledged Vincent’s past hardships and the toll incarceration would have

on his family. It nevertheless determined that the gravity of his offense and the need for

deterrence warranted a sentence within the Guidelines range. Thus, the District Court

properly “considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its]

own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States,

(2007)

(citation omitted).

Although Vincent states in passing that his sentence was substantively unreasonable

because “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 41-month prison

term,” Opening Br. 12, he offers no argumentation in support of that conclusion. As this

contention is merely “adverted to in a cursory fashion, unaccompanied by developed

argument,” it is waived. United States v. Penn,

(3d Cir. 2017) (quoting

Rodriguez v. Mun. of San Juan,

(1st Cir. 2011)). And, in any event,

Vincent’s cursory allegations do not rebut the presumption that a sentence that falls within

the Guidelines range is reasonable. See Rita,

.

3 IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

4