CLD-061 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 22-2571 ___________

LARITA A. BROWN, Appellant

v.

KEYSTONE HUMAN SERVICES; CASE MANAGEMENT UNIT; POLICE DEPARTMENT; DAUPHIN COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY ___________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-00249) District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo ____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to

(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 December 29, 2022

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., MATEY, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 13, 2023) _________

OPINION * _________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Appellant Larita Brown, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from

the District Court’s order dismissing her complaint for failure to state a claim. For the

reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.

I.

In February 2021, Brown filed a civil rights action pursuant to

against “various” police departments, Keystone Human Services, Case Management Unit

(“CMU”), and the Dauphin County Housing Authority. Brown’s complaint alleged that

the Defendants “conspired to deprive me of my civil rights,” and “are making concerted

efforts to deprive me of my freedom, food, housing, healthcare, safety, income and

more.” D.Ct. ECF No. 1 at 3-4. Brown asserted that the “police beat me, lied on me and

framed me,” and that she was “sued/forced off of my housing due to the

endeavors/fabrications of defendants. All parties have framed me as a suicidal miscreant

who needs to be institutionalized.”

Brown also filed a motion for the appointment of

counsel. See D.Ct. ECF No. 5.

A Magistrate Judge screened Brown’s complaint pursuant to

(e)(2) and determined that it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. See D.Ct. ECF No. 7. Brown was given thirty days to file an amended

complaint. Because her complaint “as written” lacked arguable merit and did not “allege

any plausible claim,” her motion for appointment of counsel was denied. D.Ct. ECF No.

8 at 7. Brown was “invited to file a new motion requesting the appointment of counsel”

once she filed an amended complaint.

2 Despite being granted multiple extensions of time, Brown did not file an amended

complaint. 1 Accordingly, a Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be

dismissed for failure to state a claim, and that further opportunity to amend would be

futile given Brown’s failure, despite ample time, to file an amended complaint. See D.Ct.

ECF No. 18. Brown filed objections to the Report and Recommendation, see D.Ct. ECF

No. 19, but those objections failed to address any of the deficiencies in the complaint

noted by the Magistrate Judge. The District Court adopted the Report and

Recommendation and dismissed Brown’s complaint pursuant to

(e)(2)(B)(ii). See D.Ct. ECF No. 20. Brown filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to

and exercise plenary review

over a District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint under § 1915(e). Dooley v.

Wetzel,

(3d Cir. 2020). To avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Talley v. Wetzel,

, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “In assessing

1 Brown did, however, file a document entitled “Injunction,” in which she alleged that the Williamsport shelter was refusing to help her and asserted that they were conspiring with the defendants to have her committed to a mental hospital. See D.Ct. ECF No. 13 at 1. The motion was deemed withdrawn when Brown did not file a brief in support as required by the District Court’s Local Rule 7.5. The District Court noted as well that if Brown wished to assert any claim against the Williamsport shelter, she should do so in her amended complaint. See D.Ct. ECF No. 17. We discern no error in the District Court’s denial of Brown’s request for an injunction, or in the denial of her motion for the appointment of counsel. 3 the Complaint, we are mindful of our obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s

pleadings.” Dooley,

(cleaned up). We may summarily affirm if the

appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

III.

Brown’s claims are brought pursuant to § 1983, which “imposes civil liability

upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist.,

, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). We agree

with the District Court’s dismissal of Brown’s claims for substantially the reasons stated

in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. First, even if Brown had

specifically identified the “various” police departments listed as defendants, her claims

against them nonetheless fail as a matter of law. While local governmental units may

constitute “persons” against whom suit may be brought under § 1983, see Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

(1978), municipal police departments are

governmental sub-units that are not distinct from the municipalities of which they are a

part, see Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp.,

, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997), and thus

may not be sued separately under § 1983.

To the extent that the Dauphin County Housing Authority is a municipal entity or

other local government unit, Brown has not alleged that the asserted violations of her

rights were the result of a policy or custom as would be necessary to implicate municipal

liability under § 1983. See Monell,

(“[A] local government may not be 4 sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employee or agents. Instead, it is

when execution of a government’s policy or custom, . . . inflicts the injury that the

government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”).

Finally, as noted in the Report and Recommendation, it does not appear that

defendants CMU and Keystone Health Services are state actors, in which case they are

not proper defendants under § 1983. To the extent that Brown alleges a § 1983

conspiracy claim involving CMU, Keystone Health Services, and the Dauphin County

Housing Authority, the District Court properly dismissed it as vague and conclusory. As

Brown failed to allege any plausible claims relating to the deprivation of her civil rights,

any conspiracy claim involving the deprivation of those rights by defendants CMU and

Keystone Health Services likewise fails.

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir.

L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

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