NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

Nos. 22-1730 & 22-2192 __________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

EDWIN H. ZIMMERMAN, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE SUNNY SIDE FAMILY TRUST, THE WEMER TRUST, AND THE HINKLEVILLE HOLDINGS TRUST; ESTHER ZIMMERMAN, IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE SUNNY SIDE FAMILY TRUST, THE WEMER TRUST, AND THE HINKLEVILLE HOLDINGS TRUST; WEMER FAMILY TRUST; HINKLEVILLE HOLDINGS TRUST; SUNNY SIDE FAMILY TRUST; KEYSTONE CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC.; PHILLIP WOLLMAN; DOUG MCCONKEY; HAROLD MILLER; ERLA SEIBEL; WILMER N. ZIMMERMAN; RUTH ANN BURKHOLDER; EDWIN N. ZIMMERMAN, JR.; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; LINDA KING; THOMAS J. REEVE

Edwin H. Zimmerman; Wilmer N. Zimmerman, Appellants

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 5-18-cv-04875) District Judge: Honorable John M. Gallagher ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 3, 2023 Before: KRAUSE, SCIRICA, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 11, 2023) ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellants Edwin and Wilmer Zimmerman (“Appellants”) appeal from

orders of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee the United States of America and

ordering the sale of real property. For the following reasons, we will affirm the orders of

the District Court.

I.

In 2018, the United States brought an action to collect unpaid taxes against Edwin

Zimmerman, his wife Esther (who is now deceased), and the WEMER Family Trust.

Other defendants included Wilmer Zimmerman and other persons and entities that might

claim interests in the real property that would be used to satisfy the debt. After obtaining

counsel, Edwin and Esther Zimmerman and the WEMER Family Trust stipulated that

they did not file tax returns or pay federal income taxes from 2002 to 2005 despite

earning income throughout that period. See ECF No. 90 at 1. They also, in the same

stipulated order entered by the District Court, waived “any and all defenses” to the

complaint, except, among other things, that the subject tax assessments were procedurally

invalid. Id. at 4.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2 The Government thereafter moved for summary judgment against Edwin and

Esther Zimmerman, the WEMER Family Trust, and Wilmer Zimmerman. Its motion was

tailored to the stipulation order and addressed the issues that had not been waived. The

District Court granted the motion and subsequently entered an order of sale foreclosing

on the Government’s tax liens and authorizing the sale of real property to satisfy the tax

debt. Appellants filed appeals of the order granting summary judgment and the order of

sale, which have been consolidated. 1

II.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to

. 2 We exercise plenary review

over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch.

Dist.,

(3d Cir. 2014).

III.

First, Appellants contend that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the action

because the Government did not produce proof of compliance with

,

which bars any action for the collection or recovery of taxes unless “the Secretary

authorizes or sanctions the proceedings and the Attorney General or his delegate directs

that the action be commenced.” The District Court ruled that Appellants had waived the

1 The District Court also entered default or other judgments against the other defendants; those rulings are not at issue. 2 Although Appellants’ notice of appeal of the order granting summary judgment was premature, it ripened after the District Court issued the order of sale, which was a final order for purposes of § 1291. See Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren,

(3d Cir. 1983). 3 issue of authorization by not preserving it in the stipulation, and noted that it appeared

that the suit was authorized. Appellants contend that the District Court erred because

jurisdictional requirements cannot be waived.

Assuming without deciding that § 7401 is jurisdictional, we reject Appellants’

contention that the action was not authorized because the Government produced sworn

affidavits by counsel stating that it was properly authorized. See ECF No. 98. In arguing

to the contrary, Appellants have pointed only to a lack of an “authorization document.” It

is unclear to what Appellants are referring, but in any event, the affidavits produced by

the Government are, under the circumstances of this case, sufficient to show

authorization. See Palmer v. IRS,

, 1311 (9th Cir. 1997).3

Appellants also contend that the District Court’s judgment improperly imposed

liability on Edwin and Esther Zimmerman and the WEMER Family Trust for a single tax

debt. Appellants essentially challenge the Government’s issuance of “whipsaw”

assessments, which are assessments of a tax against more than one taxpayer to protect the

Government when taxpayers disclaim liability. See Gerardo v. Comm’r,

(3d Cir. 1977). Such assessments are generally permissible because the tax will be

collected only once. See

.

3 Given that the parties agreed to narrow the scope of litigation to the issues in the stipulation, and this issue was raised for the first time in response to the Government’s motion for summary judgment, the District Court did not err in allowing the Government to submit evidence of authorization as part of its reply to Appellants’ opposition to summary judgment.

4 This claim, which appears to pertain to Edwin and not Wilmer Zimmerman, has

been waived. “Waiver is the intentional abandonment of an argument.” Simko v. U.S.

Steel Corp,

(3d Cir. 2021). Here, Edwin and Esther Zimmerman and

the Trust stipulated that the assessments were substantively accurate and that “any

income attributable to WEMER Family Trust, Esther Zimmerman, or Edwin Zimmerman

is properly attributable as income to all three.” ECF No. 90 at 2. They also stipulated

that the net proceeds of the sale of the real property would be paid to the United States

“until the unpaid balance of the judgments arising from the 2002-2005 federal income tax

assessments against Esther Zimmerman, Edwin Zimmerman, and WEMER Family Trust

are fully satisfied (recognizing that the United States cannot collect federal income tax

assessed on the same income more than once . . .).” Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Edwin

Zimmerman accordingly waived this argument by intentionally assenting to the accuracy

of the assessments and the manner of their collection in the stipulated order. See

Wegbreit v. Comm’r,

(7th Cir. 2021) (stating that issues stipulated

to in collection action were waived). 4

Next, Appellants contend that the District Court’s appointment of the Property

Appraisal and Liquidation Specialists (“PALS”) of the IRS to conduct the sale of the

property was improper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53. Rule 53, which

governs the district courts’ ability to appoint a master, is inapplicable here. Rather,

4 Even if this issue is not waived, it is without merit in light of the Government’s stipulation that it cannot collect federal income tax assessed on the same income more than once. See Gerardo,

. 5 pursuant to

, a district court adjudicating the merits of tax liens on a

property “may decree a sale of such property, by the proper officer of the court.” See

§ 7403(c). The Government states that PALS is routinely used to conduct judicial sales,

see, e.g., United States v. Davis,

(6th Cir. 2016), and Appellants do not

argue that the order of sale does not comply with § 7403(c). This contention is

accordingly without merit.

Appellants also contend that the order of sale improperly granted injunctive relief

by directing Edwin Zimmerman to maintain the property so as to not commit waste and

directing all persons to vacate the property within 90 days of its entry. As noted, the

District Court had authority pursuant to

to decree a sale of the property,

and along with that authority, had the discretion to set the terms and conditions of the

sale. See United States v. Branch Coal Corp.,

(3d Cir. 1968); see also

United States v. Rodgers,

(1983). Because conditions of a sale

can include the timeline for vacating the property and the maintenance of the property

pending the sale, the District Court acted within its authorized discretion in including

such provisions in its order of sale.

Finally, by failing to raise them in court, Appellants forfeited their arguments that

the interference with the property constituted an unreasonable seizure and a violation of

due process, and they have not identified any “exceptional circumstances” warranting our

review. See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of the Panther Valley Sch. Distr.,

(3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

6 We will accordingly affirm the District Court’s judgments. 5

5 We take no action upon Doug McConkey’s letter filed in this Court, as a request to modify the order of sale must be filed in the District Court. 7