Daniel Spuck v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-1193 ___________

DANIEL L. SPUCK,

Appellant v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, JANE/JOHN DOE, LEADER/HEAD OF COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00341) District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

On April 25, 2023 Before: SHWARTZ, BIBAS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 25, 2023) ____________________________________

___________ OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

Daniel Spuck, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissing his complaint with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Spuck filed a complaint against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Jane/John Doe, “Leader/Head” of the Commonwealth. Spuck sought compensatory and punitive damages for various claims relating to criminal and civil state court proceedings. 1 Dkt. No. 3 at 4-6. Spuck also requested that the District Court enjoin the Commonwealth from recovering debts he owes and pursuing contempt charges against him. 2 Id. at 6; Dkt. No. 4. The District Court, over Spuck’s objections, adopted the Report and Recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, denied Spuck’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dkt. No. 7. Spuck filed this timely appeal.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Spuck’s complaint. Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2020). We review the District Court’s denial of Spuck’s motion for a preliminary injunction for “abuse of discretion, an error of law, or a clear mistake in the consideration of proof.” Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

On appeal, Spuck challenges only the District Court’s denial of his requests for in- junctive relief. C.A. Dkt. No. 5 at 2-3. To the extent Spuck requested that the District Court intervene in a pending criminal contempt proceeding against him, the District Court correctly determined that it must abstain from doing so. 3 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (explaining that federal courts have power to enjoin state officers from insti- tuting criminal actions only “where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and imme- diate”). The extraordinary circumstances that would allow such interference do not exist here, and we discern no abuse of discretion by the District Court in denying Spuck’s re- quest.

Spuck also asks that we direct the Commonwealth to suspend the collection of his debts while his contempt proceeding is pending. C.A. Dkt. No. 5 at 3. However, Spuck’s vague assertions regarding this request are void of any information demonstrating that in- junctive relief is warranted. See Kos Pharms., 369 F.3d at 708 (explaining a party’s burden in seeking a preliminary injunction).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.