NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________

No. 22-2721 ____________

TABITHA JEAN MATTEI,

Appellant

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY ____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-21-cv-01022) District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch ____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) April 20, 2023

Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: May 16, 2023) ____________

OPINION* ____________

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

An ALJ denied Tabitha Mattei’s application for disability benefits under Title II of

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. the Social Security Act,

(a). He found that Mattei was not disabled

between April 26, 2019, and December 31, 2019, because she could perform light work

subject to some limitations. The District Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Mattei

appeals.1 We will affirm.2

Mattei faults the ALJ in this case for “refusing to consider” a prior ALJ’s

finding—related to a prior claim in which Mattei sought disability benefits between

February 9, 2016, and April 25, 2019—that she could only perform sedentary work. 3 She

urges us to adopt the standard set out in Albright v. Commissioner of Social Security

Administration,4 which the Social Security Administration has acquiesced to for

disability findings in cases brought in the Fourth Circuit. 5

We determine the meaning of the agency’s regulations in the first instance using

“all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.” 6 Mattei identifies nothing in the text,

structure, history, or purpose of the Social Security regulations that requires an ALJ,

reviewing a claim for an unadjudicated time period, to give preclusive effect to an earlier

1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under

(g). We exercise appellate jurisdiction under

. 2 “We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s determination of legal issues.” Zirnsak v. Colvin,

(3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). And we review an ALJ’s factual findings “under the deferential ‘substantial evidence’ standard.”

at 610 (quoting

(g)). 3 Mattei Br. 8. 4

(4th Cir. 1999). 5 SSAR 00-1(4),

-01 (Jan. 12, 2000); see generally

. 6 Kisor v. Wilkie,

(2019) (citation omitted).

2 administrative finding on a different claim concerning a different time period.

The Social Security Act grants “full power and authority” to the Social Security

Commissioner to “make rules and regulations and to establish procedures . . . which are

necessary or appropriate” to adjudicate disability claims, including “reasonable and

proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the

proofs and evidence” of disability claims. 7 Accordingly, the Commissioner issued

regulations that define evidence as “anything [a claimant] or anyone else submits to [the

agency] or that [the agency] obtain[s] that relates to [the] claim.” 8 In addition, the

regulations identify several “categories of evidence” and how each is evaluated to decide

a claim.9

Notably, nothing in the regulations compels adoption or even consideration of a

prior-found fact by an ALJ who decided a temporally distinct disability claim. In fact, no

category of evidence even speaks of administrative findings related to prior, temporally

distinct claims. Under preclusion doctrine, this makes sense: when a claimant seeks

disability benefits for an unadjudicated time period, she brings a new claim and raises

new issues not yet finally decided—namely, the status of her health during a different

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(a). 8

. 9

3 time period.10 We reject Mattei’s invitation to overlay novel preclusion requirements on

the unambiguous regulations.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Albright is not to the contrary. At most, Albright

requires an ALJ deciding a subsequent disability claim to consider and give “weight” to

prior administrative findings regarding a claimant’s disability status. 11 Even so, Albright

agreed that applying preclusion principles to subsequent claims involving unadjudicated

time periods is “by its nature inconsistent with the agency’s time-tested approach” of not

doing so.12 Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s rule regarding prior administrative findings is

merely an application of the “substantial evidence rule,” not, as Mattei would have it,

some novel form of preclusion.13 In any event, even if we adopted Albright’s rule, it

would be inconsequential in Mattei’s case. Here, the ALJ did, in fact, “consider[] the

prior administrative law judge decision” and found it “partially persuasive.”14

Mattei’s emphasis on the agency’s acquiescence to Albright is equally

unpersuasive. In Albright’s wake, the agency clearly stated that the decision “conflict[ed]

10 See Purter v. Heckler,

, 689 n.5 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Earley v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.,

, 933–34 (6th Cir. 2018) (reasoning “a new application for a new period of time” does not implicate claim or issue preclusion; “human health is rarely static”); cf.

(c)(1) (ALJ may dismiss request for hearing on “res judicata” grounds where request raises “same facts” and “same issue or issues” as “previous determination or decision”). 11

. 12

. 13 See

at 477–78. 14 AR 22.

4 with [the agency’s] interpretation” of its own regulations because “[i]n a subsequent

disability claim, [the agency] considers the issue of disability with respect to a period of

time that was not adjudicated in the final determination or decision on the prior claim to

be a new issue that requires an independent evaluation from that made in the prior

adjudication.” 15 The agency interprets its regulations to require “de[ ]novo” review of the

“the facts and issues” of each temporally distinct disability claim.16 Given the conflict

between the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of Social Security regulations in Albright and

the agency’s own interpretation, the agency narrowly acquiesced to Albright’s rule for

claimants in the Fourth Circuit. 17 Taken together, even if we were to lean on the agency

to aid our interpretation of Social Security regulations, 18 the agency’s acquiescence rule

evinces an agency interpretation that cuts against Mattei’s argument. Therefore, neither

Albright nor the agency’s acquiescence to it compelled the ALJ here to give preclusive

effect to the prior administrative finding regarding the prior claim period that Mattei

could only perform sedentary work.

We exercise only limited review over Mattei’s remaining challenges, which focus

on what the evidence did (or did not) prove. “We must affirm the ALJ so long as his

15 SSAR 00-1(4), 65 Fed. Reg. at 1936, 1938 (emphasis added). 16 Id. at 1938. 17 Id. 18 Cf. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415–16 (deferring to agency’s “reasonable” interpretation of its own regulations when the regulation is “genuinely ambiguous”).

5 conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.”19 “Substantial evidence is ‘such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.’” 20 The record supports the ALJ’s thorough opinion. Specifically, Mattei’s

medical records showed she suffered several impairments but that, with the passing of

time and provision of treatment, including medication and therapy, she experienced

improved functionality and reduced pain. Mattei questions how her residual functional

capacity could possibly increase between April 25, 2019 (the last day of her prior claim)

and April 26, 2019 (the first day of her current claim). But we only require evidence to

satisfy a reasonable mind. And reasonable minds may reach different conclusions—

equally supported by substantial evidence—about the same facts.21 Plus, the record

before the ALJ here included evidence not before the prior ALJ, namely that Mattei’s

condition began improving in May 2019.22 Therefore, the record provides substantial

evidence for the ALJ’s denial of Mattei’s disability claim, including his finding that she

could perform light work with certain limitations.

For these reasons, we will affirm.

19 Zirnsak,

. 20 Rutherford v. Barnhart,

(3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Reefer v. Barnhart,

(3d Cir. 2003)). 21 See Kraynak v. Flemming,

(3d Cir. 1960) (substantial evidence exists even if a court “were to reach a different result approaching the matter de novo”); cf. Williams v. Sullivan,

(3d Cir. 1992) (“Neither the district court nor this court is empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder.” (citation omitted)). 22 Compare AR 310, with AR 302.

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