CLD-107 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 22-3265 ___________

IN RE: JAMES COPPEDGE ____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the District Court for the District of Delaware (Related to Civ. No. 1:21-cv-01412) ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. March 16, 2023 Before: GREENAWAY, JR., MATEY, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed May 31, 2023) _________

OPINION* _________

PER CURIAM

In 2011, the Delaware Superior Court granted judgment in favor of U.S. Bank in a

foreclosure action against Petitioner James Coppedge. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.

Coppedge, No. CV K11L-02-042 RBY,

, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. May 5,

2015). Since then, Coppedge has repeatedly sought to challenge that judgment in both

*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. state and federal court, to no avail.1 After the property at issue was sold at a sheriff’s sale

and Coppedge was notified to vacate the premises, he filed a “Motion to Dismiss” in the

District Court. That motion was docketed as a complaint and appeared to challenge the

state court foreclosure judgment, as well as allege, inter alia, unlawful debt collection

practices by defendants Orlans PC and SLS, LLC. Coppedge sought to vacate the state

court judgment of foreclosure and void the transfer of the property. Relying in part on

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,2 the District Court dismissed the action and denied

Coppedge’s motions for reconsideration. Coppedge filed a notice of appeal, 3 and he now

seeks mandamus relief.4

While his petition is far from a model of clarity, Coppedge appears to challenge

the District Court’s dismissal by objecting to the application and existence of the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. In addition, Coppedge asks us to void the state court foreclosure

1See, inter alia, Coppedge v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n,

(Del. 2011) (table); Coppedge v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n,

(Del. 2014) (table); Coppedge v. Conway, Civ. Action No. 14-1477-GMS,

(D. Del. Jan. 12, 2015); Coppedge v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n,

(Del. 2017) (table).

2See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co.,

(1923); D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman,

(1983). 3 His appeal is pending at C.A. No. 22-2717.

4Coppedge also filed a previous petition for a writ of mandamus, petitioning this Court to direct the District Court to vacate its order dismissing the action and denying his various motions. That petition was denied on January 6, 2023. See C.A. No. 22-2867. 2 judgment against him and to cancel the transfer of property that resulted from the

sheriff’s sale.

“Mandamus provides a drastic remedy that a court should grant only in

extraordinary circumstances in response to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of

power.” In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.,

, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). To justify the Court’s use of this remedy,

Coppedge must show a clear and indisputable right to the writ and that he has no other

adequate means to obtain the relief desired. Haines v. Liggett Group Inc.,

(3d Cir. 1992). Coppedge has not met this burden.

Notably, Coppedge’s mandamus petition once again appears to challenge the

District Court’s decision (in fact, repeating issues that are the subject of his pending

appeal), and mandamus is not a substitute for appeal. See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd.,

(3d Cir. 2003) (“If, in effect, an appeal will lie, mandamus will not.”). To

the extent that Coppedge seeks to have this Court vacate the state court judgment of

foreclosure and void the sale of the subject property, we deny his request as we are

generally without authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a state court, or otherwise

compel a state actor to perform a state action. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings,

(3d Cir. 1981); In re Wolenski,

(3d Cir. 1963) (per

curiam).

Accordingly, we will deny the mandamus petition.

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