United States v. Dexton Brunson

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ________________ No. 20-3587 ________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DEXTON BRUNSON, Appellant ________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D. C. No. 1-17-cr-00068-001) District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III ________________ Argued on January 10, 2023 Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS and ROTH, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: June 1, 2023)

Brianna K. Edwards David R. Fine (ARGUED) K&L Gates North Second Street 18th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17101 Counsel for Appellant William A. Behe Carlo D. Marchioli (ARGUED) Office of United States Attorney Middle District of Pennsylvania Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754 Federal Building and Courthouse Harrisburg, PA 17101 Counsel for Appellee ________________ OPINION* ________________ ROTH, Circuit Judge I.

Agents arrested Dexton Brunson in his home. During a security sweep, they found small chunks of marijuana on the hallway floor and a one-dollar bill with a white powdery substance in Brunson’s pocket. One of the agents instructed Trooper Rodney Fink to apply for a search warrant. Trooper Fink’s search warrant application stated that “while securing the pants of Defendant[,] [the police] located a baggie containing cocaine.” 1 A local magistrate judge signed a warrant authorizing a search of Brunson’s home, during which police recovered drugs, money, jewelry, and other assets.

A grand jury indicted Brunson, and the District Court appointed Samuel Rivera to represent Brunson. Rivera moved to suppress, and the District Court held an evidentiary hearing. The court challenged Rivera’s need to question anyone besides Trooper Fink, because “to call [additional] witnesses . . . seems inapt.” 2 Trooper Fink testified that his prior description of the cocaine as having been found inside a baggie—as opposed to inside a one-dollar bill—was a mistake. On cross-examination, Rivera focused on the timing of the search. Rivera asked no additional questions of Trooper Fink and presented no witnesses of his own.

The District Court denied Brunson’s motion because he failed to make a showing to overcome the presumption of validity under Franks v. Delaware.3 Brunson then entered into a plea agreement with the government. After noting that he was displeased with the plea agreement and with Rivera’s representation, Brunson and the government entered into a new, conditional plea agreement. The agreement permitted Brunson to withdraw his guilty plea if we ruled in Brunson’s favor on his appeal of the suppression motion. Brunson pleaded guilty and appealed. We affirmed the District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

Brunson then brought a § 2255 habeas petition, alleging that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at his suppression hearing. The District Court denied Brunson’s petition without holding a hearing and declined to enter a certificate of appealability. We granted Brunson’s motion for a certificate of appealability to determine whether the District Court should have held an evidentiary hearing under §

2255. Because the record conclusively establishes that Brunson is not entitled to habeas relief, we will affirm.

II.

Section 2255 directs a district court to conduct promptly an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.”4 To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must demonstrate their counsel’s performance was deficient and the deficiency prejudiced the movant.5 Thus, a hearing is not required where “a nonfrivolous claim clearly fails to demonstrate either deficiency of counsel’s performance or prejudice to the defendant.” 6 The record conclusively establishes that Brunson’s claim fails under Strickland’s first prong. The deficiency prong asks whether counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.7 Courts are hesitant to question counsel’s decisions, as “there is a strong presumption that counsel [focused on particular issues] for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect”8 and that their conduct “falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”9 To overcome that presumption, the challenger must show that the posited strategy did not motivate counsel or that counsel’s “actions could never be considered part of a sound strategy.” 10 Brunson fails to overcome this presumption as a matter of law. The District Court points to several well-reasoned and appropriate tactical strategies to support Rivera’s actions.11 First, the record demonstrates that further questioning about Trooper Fink’s characterization of the cocaine would have been futile.12 Second, the record conclusively supports Rivera’s strategic decision not to call the other officers, Wilson, and Brunson regarding the marijuana. 13 Because the record demonstrates at least two unchallenged tactical reasons for Rivera’s conduct, we find that the record conclusively demonstrates that Rivera’s conduct was not deficient. Thus, Brunson does not meet his burden.14 For the above reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.