Issac Morales v. Premier Fleet Services

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Issac Morales v. Premier Fleet Services

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ______________

No. 21-3193 ____________

ISSAC MORALES, Appellant

v.

PREMIER FLEET SERVICES

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 5:20-cv-6485) District Judge: Honorable John M. Gallagher ____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) June 6, 2023

Before: HARDIMAN, AMBRO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: June 13, 2023)

____________

OPINION * ____________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

Issac Morales appeals the District Court’s summary judgment for his former

employer Premier Fleet Services. We will affirm for the same reason given by the

District Court.

I

Premier hired Morales, who walks with a limp, to work as a welder. During the

interview, Premier told Morales he would need to supply his own tools for the job. But

Morales came to work without the required tools and began borrowing other welder’s

tools. When he couldn’t borrow another welder’s rolling chair, he would lean on the

welding table and sometimes worked under trailers by bending on his knees. According

to Morales, when his supervisor reminded him of the requirement that he supply his own

tools, Morales replied “[w]ell, I’ll start buying my own stuff when you pay me more.”

App. 137. Less than three months into the job, Premier terminated his employment.

Morales sued, alleging he was wrongfully terminated in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act. After discovery, the District Court granted Premier’s

motion for summary judgment. Morales timely appealed. 1

II

To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the ADA, a plaintiff

must show “(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1331

. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291

. Our review is de novo. Burton v. Teleflex Inc.,

707 F.3d 417, 425

(3d Cir. 2013). We apply the same standard as the District Court, construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 2 otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without

reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has suffered an otherwise

adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc.,

134 F.3d 576, 580

(3d Cir. 1998).

The District Court granted Premier summary judgment because Morales could not

satisfy the second prong of his prima facie case—that he was qualified to perform the

essential functions of his job at Premier. We agree.

We apply a two-part test to determine whether a plaintiff is a qualified individual

under the ADA. McNelis v. Pa. Power & Light Co.,

867 F.3d 411, 415

(3d Cir. 2017).

First, the individual must satisfy “the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-

related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires.”

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

(m) (emphasis added). Second, the individual, “with or without

reasonable accommodation, [must be able to] perform the essential functions of such

position.”

Id.

Morales argues that lacking tools cannot render him unqualified. But it can.

Premier required welders to supply their own tools, making it a “job-related

requirement.” See

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

(m). Morales concedes he was aware of the

requirement and did not satisfy it. He also concedes that Premier enforced the

requirement uniformly. And he makes no other argument that the requirement was

discriminatory or unrelated to the job’s essential functions. As the District Court rightly

held, Morales could not show he was “qualified” for the job on these facts. So his ADA

3 claim failed the second element of his prima facie case and Premier was entitled to

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We will affirm.

4

Reference

Status
Unpublished