Sonia Veloso Da Silva v. Attorney General United States of America

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________ No. 22-2158 _____________ SONIA MARIA VELOSO DA SILVA, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ______________ On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A088-798-038 Immigration Judge: Alberto J. Riefkohl ______________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on March 23, 2023

Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and McKEE Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: June 14, 2023) _______________________ OPINION ∗ _______________________

∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

Sonia Maria Veloso Da Silva petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of her appeal of an immigration judge’s denial of adjustment of status.

For the following reasons, we will dismiss in part for lack of jurisdiction and deny in part. 1 I.

Da Silva, a Brazilian national, arrived in the United States in 1994 under a temporary visitor’s visa. She remained in the country when that visa expired. In 1997, although she had not left the U.S., Da Silva applied for another temporary visitor’s visa.

She did so by mailing her application to the U.S. Consulate in Brazil. That visa was granted.

In 2007, she applied for an adjustment of status. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied this application, concluding that she was inadmissible because she had willfully misrepresented a material fact—namely, where she was resident—in her second visa application.

Da Silva was then placed into removal proceedings. The IJ found her removable as charged and ineligible for adjustment of status because of the same willful misrepresentation. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Da Silva’s adjustment of status and dismissed her appeal. This appeal followed.

II. 2 We lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of discretionary relief proceedings. 3 We maintain jurisdiction to review questions of law de novo. 4 Da Silva argues that the BIA and IJ committed constitutional and legal error in concluding that she made a willful misrepresentation of a material fact. However, the determination of willfulness is a finding of fact. 5 Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review that claim and dismiss it. 6 She further argues that the misrepresentation was immaterial. 7 We disagree. Her misrepresentation likely “shut off a line of inquiry” that otherwise would have revealed that she overstayed her first visa by more than a decade, which would likely have resulted in the denial of her second visitor visa application. 8 We therefore agree with the BIA that Da Silva did not meet her burden of demonstrating that she was admissible. 9 Finally, Da Silva argues that her case should be remanded to the Board to consider the “legal impact of the defective charging document.” 10 When a Notice to Appear omits the date and time of the first hearing, the omission is harmless where there is no apparent prejudice. 11 Because Da Silva fails to allege any prejudice caused by the omission of the date and time on her NTA, this argument also fails. 12 III.

For the reasons described above, we therefore dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part.