PRECEDENTIAL

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
               _____________

                   No. 21-2291
                  _____________

      EDIN DONELSY MADRID-MANCIA,
                    Petitioner

                         v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF
               AMERICA
            _______________

     On Petition for Review of a Decision of the
           Board of Immigration Appeals
         (Agency Case No. A206-643-376)
          Immigration Judge: David Cheng
                 _______________

                      Argued
                  January 25, 2023

Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and MATEY, Circuit
                   Judges.

                (Filed: July 3, 2023)
Aleksandra N. Gontaryuk [ARGUED]
AG Law Firm
711 Jersey Avenue, Suite 202
New Brunswick, NJ 08901

Jill S. Westerberg
AG Law Firm
P.O. Box 10188
PMB 45115
Newark, NJ 07101
        Counsel for Petitioner

Merrick B. Garland
Spencer Shucard [ARGUED]
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
       Counsel for Respondent

                      _______________

                 OPINION OF THE COURT
                     _______________

MATEY, Circuit Judge.

       Edin Donelsy Madrid-Mancia received a document
labeled “Notice to Appear” from the Department of Homeland
Security informing her that she faced removal, but it omitted




                                 2
the date and time of her removal hearing. A harmless oversight,
reasons the Department of Justice, because it sent Madrid-
Mancia a second document (this one labeled “Notice of
Hearing”) years later providing the missing information. When
Madrid-Mancia did not appear as directed, she was ordered
removed in absentia. But Congress only allows a supplemental
notice “in the case of any change or postponement in the time
and place of [an alien’s removal] proceedings.” 

(a)(2)(A). Here, no change or postponement occurred,
and DHS never issued a new Notice to Appear, so we will grant
Madrid-Mancia’s petition and remand for the agency to rescind
her removal order.

                              I.

       For some time, the Attorney General has informed
aliens about upcoming removal proceedings using a two-step
process. First, the alien receives a putative Notice to Appear
(“NTA”), often on arrival, omitting information about the time
or date of the removal hearing. Then, an immigration court
housed within the Justice Department’s Executive Office for
Immigration Review mails the alien a “Notice of Hearing,”
often years later, announcing the removal hearing schedule.
This patchwork process strays from the statute designed to
control it. To understand how far it has wandered, we go back
to where it began.

                              A.

       The practice of starting removal proceedings with an
NTA began when Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(“IIRIRA”), 

Div. C, § 304(a)(3), 

-546, 3009-587. Under the Act, every NTA must




                              3
contain “[t]he time and place at which the [removal]
proceedings will be held.” 

(a)(1)(G)(i). But
this was not always so.

       Before IIRIRA, removal (then called deportation)
proceedings could begin only after an alien was “given notice,
reasonable under all the circumstances, of the nature of the
charges against him and of the time and place at which the
proceedings [would] be held.” Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, 

(b)(1), 

,
209. The Attorney General followed this directive, issuing
regulations requiring an “order to show cause” containing the
hearing’s “time and place.” 

, 98–99 (Jan. 6,
1956) (codified at 

(b) (1957)).

        But the Immigration and Naturalization Service
eventually found that process too cumbersome, claiming it was
often “not possible to hold the hearing as specified in the order
to show cause.” 

, 36,238 (Aug. 16, 1978).
So the Attorney General drafted a new rule relaxing the time-
and-place requirement. This allowed the information to “be
stated in the order [to show cause] or . . . later specified.” 

 (codified at 

(b) (1979)) (emphasis
added). Another regulation instructed immigration courts to
provide the time-and-place information whenever it was
omitted from the order to show cause. See 

,
2939 (Jan. 29, 1987) (codified at 

(b) (1988)).
Together, these regulations are the blueprint for the two-step
system the Justice Department used in this case: send a show
cause order without time-and-place information, and count on
an immigration court to provide it later.

       Congress responded agreeably and codified these
regulations in the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-




                                 4
649, 

. The Act required an “order to show cause”
to initiate all deportation proceedings. 

 § 545(a), 104 Stat. at
5061–62 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252b (1994)). And it defined
an “order to show cause” as “written notice . . . specifying”
information such as “[t]he acts or conduct alleged to be in
violation of law,” “[t]he charges against the alien and the
statutory provisions alleged to have been violated,” and the fact
that “[t]he alien may be represented by counsel.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252b(a)(1) (1994). There was no need to include time-and-
place information—that could be provided “in the order to
show cause or otherwise.” Id. § 1252b(a)(2)(A) (emphasis
added). Meaning immigration courts could continue to follow
up later with the omitted time-and-place information. See 

(b) (1995).

        IIRIRA did a U-turn. Orders to show cause became
“notice[s] to appear.” 

(a)(1). And every NTA
had to “specify[] . . . [t]he time and place at which the
proceedings [would] be held.” 

 § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). This new
language foreclosed on the Attorney General’s past ability to
send time-and-place information in a second document—a
change the Executive Branch immediately recognized. With
IIRIRA’s April 1, 1997, effective date approaching, the INS
and the EOIR jointly issued a proposed rule to “implement[]
the language of the amended Act indicating that the time and
place of the hearing must be on the Notice to Appear.” 

, 449 (Jan. 3, 1997). The agencies said they would
“attempt to implement this requirement as fully as possible by
April 1, 1997,” with the aid of “automated scheduling.” 

 But
the preamble to the proposed rule claimed that “such
automated scheduling [would] not be possible in every
situation (e.g., power outages, computer crashes/downtime[]).”




                                5


 And the final rule—now codified at 

.181—
states that the Executive “shall provide in the Notice to Appear,
the time, place and date of the initial removal hearing, where
practicable.” 62 Fed Reg. at 457 (emphasis added). A
convenience Congress did not write into the bills passed by
both Houses and presented to the President for approval.

        For a time, executive agencies demonstrated their
ability to take care that IIRIRA’s requirements be faithfully
executed, developing an “Interactive Scheduling System”
(“ISS” for short) that “enable[d] the Department of Homeland
Security . . . to enter case data and to schedule the initial master
calendar hearing.” Uniform Docketing System Manual, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review,
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, at I-2 (Rev. Sept.
2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1157516/download
(“Docketing Manual”). ISS ensured that every NTA would
automatically “contain the date and time of hearing,” 

 right
down to the exact courtroom.2 Then, for whatever reason, DHS
stopped using ISS around May 2014, choosing instead to return
to the two-step process for all removal proceedings. 3 The


       1
          See 

, 9830 (Feb. 28, 2003)
(transferring 

 to 

).
       2
         See Brief of Former BIA Chairman and Immigration
Judge Paul Wickham Schmidt as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 6, Pereira v. Sessions, 

 (2018) (No.
17-459) (“ISS . . . allowed DHS to specify an exact date, time,
and courtroom for the Master Calendar in the NTA, while also
marking that date as now occupied by the new case.”).
       3
          See Defendant Executive Office for Immigration
Review’s Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories




                                 6
Executive’s    exception    had    circumvented     Congress’s
command.

       That decision received a cold reception at the Supreme
Court. In Pereira v. Sessions, for example, the Court rejected
the Justice Department’s attempt to rely on an NTA lacking
time-and-date information to trigger the “stop-time rule.” 

, 2113–14 (2018). 4 Here we consider a different


at 8, attached as Ex. F. to Decl. of Glenda M. Aldana Madrid
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Mendez Rojas v.
Kelly, No. 2:16-cv-01024 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2017), ECF
No.                                                        58-1,
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/fil
es/litigation_documents/mendez-
rojas_v_john_son_exhibits_in_support_of_plantiffs_motion_f
or_summary_judgement.pdf. Between 2015 and 2018, “almost
100 percent” of “notices to appear” lacked “the time and date
of the proceeding.” Pereira v. Sessions, 

(2018) (citation omitted).
        4
           The government revived ISS after Pereira. See
Memorandum from James R. McHenry III, Director, to All of
EOIR                 (Dec.               21,              2018),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1122771/download
(“Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira . . . [a]ll
three DHS components authorized to issue NTAs now have
access to ISS. . . . DHS may utilize ISS in order to schedule
hearings for specific dates and to reflect those scheduled
hearings on NTAs.”). Then it merged ISS’s functionality into
the EOIR Courts & Appeals System, which allows DHS users
to “[s]chedule an initial master hearing for non-detained cases”
“24 hours / 7 days a week.” EOIR Courts & Appeals System




                               7
section of IIRIRA, but the issue is the same: whether the
government’s two-step notice scheme follows Congress’s
command. We hold it does not. Notice in steps or stages may
be efficient or convenient, but “the personal liberty of
individuals . . . cannot ever be abridged at the mere discretion
of the [Executive], without the explicit permission of the laws.”
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *134 (George
Sharswood ed., 1893) (1765).

                               B.

        With the background painted, we turn to Madrid-
Mancia, who entered the United States from Honduras without
being admitted or paroled. She was immediately detained and
served a putative NTA charging her as removable. The
document advised Madrid-Mancia of the nature of her removal
proceedings and the supporting legal authority. It also
contained allegations about her specific conduct, and a citation
to the statutory provision she allegedly violated. See 

(a)(1)(A)–(D). The putative NTA directed Madrid-
Mancia that she was “required to provide the DHS, in writing,
with [her] full mailing address and telephone number,” and
“notify the Immigration Court immediately” of any changes in
this information. A.R. 118. It also warned Madrid-Mancia that
“a removal order may be made by the immigration judge in
[her] absence” if she failed to appear when summoned. 

 But
the document did not tell Madrid-Mancia when her removal
hearing would take place. Only that the hearing would occur
on “a date to be set at a time to be set.” A.R. 117. Madrid-

(ECAS) – Online Filing: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review
(Sept. 23, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/ecas/dhs-FAQs
(select “Q: What are the benefits of ECAS?” hyperlink).




                               8
Mancia acknowledged service and provided a mailing address
where she planned to reside.

       Around April 2014, Madrid-Mancia moved from the
address she provided to a new residence. 5 Years later, in
August 2017, the Newark Immigration Court mailed a
document captioned “Notice of Hearing in Removal
Proceedings” to the address Madrid-Mancia provided at the
border. A.R. 116. It stated that her hearing was scheduled for
“Aug[ust] 30, 2017 at 1:00 P.M.” A.R. 116. But it did not
provide information on the nature of her proceedings, the
government’s allegations, or the statutory provision she
allegedly violated. Madrid-Mancia claims she never received
this document and, when she did not appear at the hearing, an
Immigration Judge ordered her removed in absentia.

       In October 2019, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement sent Madrid-Mancia a letter requesting that she
appear before a Deportation Officer. Madrid-Mancia complied
and voluntarily reported as directed. There, Madrid-Mancia
learned she had been ordered removed in absentia. She



       5
         About a month later, she “went to the Mount Laurel
ICE Office to change [her] address.” A.R. 99. But “they told
[her] that there was no way for [her] to change [her] address
since [she] was not in their system.” A.R. 99. Since Madrid-
Mancia’s cousin still lived at the original address, she “knew
that [she] could rely on him to regularly check the mail for [her]
so that [she did] not miss any documentation.” A.R. 99.
Madrid-Mancia claims she either went to the original address
or called her cousin every three days to see if she received
anything from immigration authorities.




                                9
promptly moved to reopen her proceedings and rescind her in
absentia removal order for lack of proper notice.

       The IJ denied Madrid-Mancia’s motion, and the Board
of Immigration Appeals dismissed her appeal. Madrid-Mancia
timely petitioned for review.6


       6
           The BIA had jurisdiction under 

(b)(3) and dismissed the appeal on June 7, 2021.
Madrid-Mancia timely petitioned for review on July 7, 2021,
and we have jurisdiction under 

(a). We review
the BIA’s written opinion and the underlying IJ ruling “only
insofar as the BIA defers to it.” Huang v. Att’y Gen., 

 (3d Cir. 2010). And we review the agency’s denial of
Madrid-Mancia’s motion to reopen her proceedings and
rescind her removal order for an abuse of discretion. Darby v.
Att’y Gen., 

 (3d Cir. 2021). Reversal is
warranted only if the agency acted in a manner that was
“arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” 

 We review all the
agency’s legal conclusions de novo. 

        Madrid-Mancia suggests we should also review a
decision the BIA issued in response to a second motion to
reopen that she filed directly with the BIA. But “[b]ecause
[Madrid-Mancia] has not petitioned for review of the [BIA’s
May 2022 decision], we lack jurisdiction to review it.” Camara
v. Att’y Gen., 

, 201 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2009). Still,
Madrid-Mancia has properly sought review of the BIA’s June
2021 decision. And that decision presents two preserved issues
for our review: 1) whether Madrid-Mancia’s defective NTA
alone requires reopening and rescission given the notice
requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A); and 2) whether
Madrid-Mancia has rebutted the presumption of delivery




                               10
                              II.

        Congress empowered the Attorney General to order an
alien removed in absentia after providing proper written notice.
That notice always requires an NTA containing time-and-place
information. In cases involving “any change or postponement
in the time and place of [removal] proceedings,” 

(a)(2)(A), the alien must receive additional notice
specifying “the new time or place of the proceedings,” 

§ 1229(a)(2)(A)(i). Madrid-Mancia’s putative NTA lacked the
time and date of her removal hearing. And because no hearing
at all had been scheduled, the additional “Notice of Hearing”
the Immigration Court sent Madrid-Mancia identified a time or
place but did not communicate any “change” or
“postponement.” Given the Attorney General’s failure to
provide proper written notice, we will grant Madrid-Mancia’s
petition for review and remand for reopening and rescission.

                              A.

       Our analysis of IIRIRA’s in absentia removal provision
requires us to “proceed[] methodically” through the statute’s
text. Badgerow v. Walters, 

 (2022). The
goal, as always, is to give effect to the legislature’s charge,
Brown v. Barry, 

 (1797), as expressed
in the text’s “ordinary meaning . . . at the time Congress
enacted the statute,” Perrin v. United States, 

(1979). This is a “fundamental canon of statutory

despite the no-notice provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B).
Our decision on the first issue is sufficient to resolve this
petition. Madrid-Mancia prevails because the government gave
her a putative NTA without time-and-date information. See
infra Section II.B.




                              11
construction.” Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 

 (2018) (quoting Perrin, 

). See also Minor
v. Mechanics’ Bank of Alexandria, 

(1828). We interpret the language using “all the standard tools
of interpretation,” Kisor v. Wilkie, 

(2019), reading the words “in their context and with a view to
their place in the overall statutory scheme,” Parker Drilling
Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 

 (2019)
(citation omitted). See also United States v. Fisher, 

 (1805) (“It is undoubtedly a well established
principle in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be
considered, and the intention of the legislature to be extracted
from the whole.”). And where these efforts lead to multiple
ordinary meanings, we adopt “the best reading” of the statutory
text. Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Rsrv., 

 (2021).

        The removal provision of IIRIRA states that “[a]ny
alien who, after written notice required under paragraph (1) or
(2) of section 1229(a) of this title has been provided to the
alien . . . , does not attend a proceeding under this section, shall
be ordered removed in absentia if [the government] establishes
by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the written
notice was so provided.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). The
removal mandate (an alien who misses a removal hearing must
be ordered to leave the country) comes with a condition
precedent (the alien must have received the required notice
before the hearing). 7 Meaning an alien cannot be ordered


       7
         We have already held that an NTA lacking time-or-
place information does not “deprive[] an immigration judge of
jurisdiction over the removal proceedings.” See Nkomo v. Att’y




                                12
removed in absentia without proper notice. The rescission
provision mirrors the removal provision. It states that an in
absentia removal order “may be rescinded . . . at any time if the
alien demonstrates that the alien did not receive notice in
accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a) of this
title.” Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). Both sections invite the
question: what kind of notice is required under paragraphs (1)
and (2) of § 1229(a)?

       IIRIRA provides the answer. The notice under
paragraph (1) is a “[n]otice to appear,” or again, NTA for short.
Id. § 1229(a)(1). IIRIRA states that every NTA must
“specify[]” several pieces of case-initiating information, 8
including the “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings
will be held.” Id. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Sometimes plans change
and the agency needs to move the time or place of an alien’s


Gen., 

 (3d Cir. 2019). Our holding today
leaves Nkomo’s rule intact. We merely clarify the kind of
notice the government must provide before it can order an alien
removed in absentia.
       8
         Specifically: (A) “[t]he nature of the proceedings
against the alien,” (B) “[t]he legal authority under which the
proceedings are conducted,” (C) “[t]he acts or conduct alleged
to be in violation of law,” (D) “[t]he charges against the alien
and the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated,”
(E) information about representation by counsel, (F) “[t]he
requirement that the alien must immediately provide (or have
provided) the Attorney General with a written record of an
address and telephone number (if any) at which the alien may
be contacted respecting proceedings,” and (G) “[t]he time and
place at which the proceedings will be held.” 

(a)(1).




                               13
removal proceedings. That is where notice under paragraph (2)
comes in: “in the case of any change or postponement in the
time and place of such proceedings,” the government must
inform the alien of “the new time or place of the proceedings.”

 § 1229(a)(2)(A). IIRIRA aptly calls this other notice a
“[n]otice of change in time or place of proceedings.” 9 Id.
§ 1229(a)(2).

        These provisions entitle Madrid-Mancia to relief. The
government needed to give Madrid-Mancia “written notice
required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).” 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). But it gave her a putative NTA that
omitted the time and date of her hearing, even though notice
under paragraph (1) requires “[t]he time and place at which the
proceedings will be held.” Id. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). And it gave
her a so-called “Notice of Hearing” that scheduled the time and
date of her hearing, even though notice under paragraph (2) is


       9
         The Justice Department prefers a different label in its
briefing: a “Notice of Hearing” or “NOH.” See, e.g., Response
Br. 4. A term likely borrowed from the form it mailed Madrid-
Mancia captioned “Notice of Hearing in Removal
Proceedings.” A.R. 116. But that is not what Congress said,
and one needs no years of law school to see the difference
between a “notice of hearing” and a “[n]otice of change in time
or place of proceedings.” See 

(a)(2). While
“headings and titles are not meant to take the place of the
detailed provisions of the text,” Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v.
Baltimore & O. R. Co., 

 (1947), the label here
confirms what the following provision makes clear: a second
notice is only applicable “in the case of any change or
postponement in the time and place of [removal] proceedings.”
8 U.S.C § 1229(a)(2)(A).




                              14
applicable only “in the case of any change or postponement in
the time and place of such proceedings.” Id. § 1229(a)(2)(A).
Both documents are glasses half full that leave Madrid-Mancia
without the kind of “written notice required under paragraph
(1) or (2).” Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(A).

                               B.

       The Justice Department concedes that Madrid-Mancia’s
putative NTA omitted the time and date of her removal
proceeding. But it argues she still received sufficient notice
because the word “or” in the removal provision means it only
needed to provide Madrid-Mancia with either an NTA under
paragraph (1) or a “Notice of Hearing” under paragraph (2).
See Response Br. 10–11 (“Notice under either subsection
(a)(1) or (a)(2) is ‘sufficient’ . . . .”); Gov’t Suppl. Br. 13–14
(“[S]ervice of either a compliant NTA or a compliant NOH
authorizes an in absentia removal.”). According to the
Department, this disjunctive phrasing makes Madrid-Mancia’s
defective NTA immaterial. Madrid-Mancia got a “Notice of
Hearing,” A.R. 116, and that alone, it concludes, is enough for
in absentia removal.

       That is not enough because § 1229a(b)(5)(A) always
requires a complete NTA. And the Attorney General cannot
cure defects in an NTA by sending out a self-styled “Notice of
Hearing” because announcing the time and date of a removal
hearing for the first time is not a “change or postponement” in
the time or place. 

(a)(2)(A).

                               1.

       We look at the text and structure of the removal
provision, mindful that interpretation should not be “confined




                               15
to a single sentence” because “the text of the whole statute
gives instruction as to its meaning.” Maracich v. Spears, 

 (2013). The statute authorizes in absentia removal
only “after written notice required under paragraph (1) or (2)
of section 1229(a).” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (emphasis
added). So when and what kind of notice is “required” is
spelled out in paragraphs (1) and (2). Id.

       Paragraph (1) applies to all “removal proceedings under
section 1229a.” Id. § 1229(a)(1). And it states that aliens “shall
be given” “a ‘notice to appear’” containing “[t]he time and
place at which the proceedings will be held.” Id.
§ 1229(a)(1)(G)(i); see Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 

, 1480 (2021) (“The singular article ‘a’ [in § 1229(a)]
stubbornly require[s] ‘a’ written notice containing all the
required information.”). Paragraph (2) places another
requirement on the Executive, but only “in the case of any
change or postponement in the time and place of such
proceedings.” 

(a)(2)(A). Here, “a written
notice shall be given” to the alien disclosing “the new time or
place of the proceedings.” 

 § 1229(a)(2)(A)(i). So in every
case, an alien must receive an NTA containing the time and
place of the removal hearing. Additional notice is only
“required,” id. § 1229a(b)(5)(A), under paragraph (2) if the
agency changes or postpones the time or place of the hearing.
All showing that the notice requirement in paragraph (2)
applies along with—not in place of—the notice requirement in
paragraph (1).

       The structure of § 1229(a) similarly shows that a
“[n]otice of change in time or place of proceedings,” id.
§ 1229(a)(2), may supplement—but not substitute—a
“[n]otice to appear,” id. § 1229(a)(1). See 1 Edward Coke, The
First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England § 728, at




                               16
381a (19th ed. 1832) (1628) (“[I]t is the most naturall and
genuine exposition of a statute to construe one part of the
statute by another part of the same statute, for that best
expresseth the meaning of the makers.”). Paragraph (1)
contains an exhaustive list of information that “shall be given”
“[i]n removal proceedings under section 1229a.” 

(a)(1). It requires that the government give notice of the
“nature of the proceedings,” the agency’s “legal authority,” the
“acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of law,” and the
“charges against the alien.” 

 § 1229(a)(1)(A)–(D).
Paragraph (2) requires none of this. It merely obligates the
government to keep an alien informed of any “change[s] or
postponement[s]” to the “time and place” of her proceedings.
Id. § 1229(a)(2)(A).

       These textual and structural differences demonstrate the
distinct purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2). See 1 Blackstone,
Commentaries *60 (“[T]he most universal and effectual way
of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are
dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it; or the
cause which moved the legislator to enact it.”). A “written
notice” is “required under paragraph (1),” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(5)(A), in all “removal proceedings under section
1229a,” id. § 1229(a)(1). It must contain “[t]he time and place
at which the proceedings will be held.” Id. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i).
But a “written notice” is “required under paragraph . . . (2),”
id. § 1229a(b)(5)(A), only “in the case of any change or
postponement in the time and place of such proceedings,” id.
§ 1229(a)(2)(A).

       As best read, the use of “or” in § 1229a(b)(5)(A) means
the government may remove an alien in absentia after
providing her with a compliant NTA or, “in the case of any
change or postponement,” a compliant NTA plus a second




                              17
notice that informs her of the “new time or place of the
proceedings.” Id. § 1229(a)(2)(A). Sufficient notice can be a
compliant NTA without a second notice. But it cannot consist
of a putative second notice without a compliant NTA.

                                2.

       All agree Madrid-Mancia’s putative NTA lacked the
time and date of her removal proceeding. And the Justice
Department does not (and could not) argue that the “Notice of
Hearing” it mailed Madrid-Mancia communicated a
“postponement” in the hearing time. Instead, it states that the
“Notice of Hearing” announced a “change” in the time of
Madrid-Mancia’s hearing—from “to be set” to a date certain.
In a vacuum, the word “change” might have this broad
meaning. See Change, Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 372 (1993) (“to make different”). Or it may mean
something much narrower, such as “[a]n alteration; a
modification or addition; [or] substitution of one thing for
another.” Change, Black’s Law Dictionary 231 (6th ed. 1990).

        Hopeless ambiguity? Hardly, once we apply the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation to reach the “best
interpretation,” Kisor, 

 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring), that explains “how a reasonable person,
conversant with the relevant social and linguistic conventions,
would read the text in context,” John F. Manning, The
Absurdity Doctrine, 

, 2392–93 (2003).

        Context shows the narrow definition of “change” fits
best within paragraph (2). That is, when the provision states
that it applies only “in the case of any change . . . in the time”
of removal proceedings, the word “change” presupposes a time
has already been set. 

(a)(2)(A). Clue number




                               18
one: the immediately preceding statutory provision requires the
agency to set an initial time and place for the removal hearing.
See 

 § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) (requiring all NTAs to inform the
alien of “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be
held”). Clue number two adds more: once the agency has set
an initial time for the hearing and the time changes, paragraph
(2) requires the agency to tell the alien of “the new time or
place of the proceedings.” Id. § 1229(a)(2)(A)(i). Not the
“initial time,” or even “the time.” 10 But “the new time.” Id.
(emphasis added).

       Both clues confirm what common sense suggests:
IIRIRA requires the agency to give an alien time-and-place
information in her NTA, and then let her know if that
information changes. The agency cannot opt out of the time-
and-place requirement and then cure any deficiencies by
providing that information—for the first time—in a document
reserved to communicate “the new time or place” of
proceedings “in the case of any change or postponement.” Id.
§ 1229(a)(2)(A).

      Ordinary usage illustrates the meaning of the text in
context.11 Any reasonable reader would understand paragraph

       10
           Paragraph (1) already requires “[t]he time.” 

(a)(1)(G)(i).
        11
            The statutory history discussed in Section I.A
solidifies our understanding. As outlined, the government
could serve an “order to show cause” without time-and-place
information before IIRIRA. See 43 Fed. Reg. at 36,239 (stating
that time-and-place information “may be stated in the order [to
show cause] or may be later specified” (emphasis added)); 8
U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2)(A) (1994) (stating that time-and-place




                              19
(2)’s use of “change” to mean a change from something to a
different something—not from nothing to something. Cf. In re
Brewer, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Ex nihilo nihil
fit.”); William Shakespeare, King Lear, act 1, sc. 1 (Bernhard
Tauchnitz 1868) (“Nothing will come of nothing.”). Examples
abound. No reasonable diner would expect to get seating for
two by calling a restaurant to “change” a reservation he never
made. Confusion, not a boarding pass, would follow a
traveler’s request to “change” a flight from business to first
class when no seat of any kind had been purchased. Informing
the dealership that you want to “change” your new convertible
from metallic blue to classic silver only gets you a different
color if you have already bought the car. Calling the first try a
second thought is a clumsy (and likely unsuccessful) way to
make plans or purchases.



information could be provided “in the order to show cause or
otherwise” (emphasis added)). But IIRIRA extinguished the
government’s ability to provide time-and-place information at
a later date. It required (and still requires) service of “a ‘notice
to appear’ . . . specifying . . . [t]he time and place at which the
proceedings will be held.” 

(a)(1)(G)(i). “When
Congress amends legislation” like this, we “must ‘presume it
intends [the change] to have real and substantial effect.’” Ross
v. Blake, 

, 641–42 (2016) (quoting Stone v. INS,

 (1995)). IIRIRA requires the government to
serve NTAs that inform aliens of the time and place of their
proceeding. Though agency regulations only require time-and-
place information in an NTA “where practicable,” 

(b), “self-serving regulations never ‘justify departing
from the statute’s clear text.’” Niz-Chavez, 

(quoting Pereira, 

).




                                20
      So too with the attempt to order Madrid-Mancia
removed in absentia based on a provision designed only to
communicate changes in the time or place of her removal
proceeding. The provision only applies when changes in the
time or place arise, not when the government first sets the
schedule. A conclusion the Supreme Court endorsed in
Pereira:

       By allowing for a “change or postponement” of
       the proceedings to a “new time or place,”
       paragraph (2) presumes that the [g]overnment
       has already served a “notice to appear under
       section 1229(a)” that specified a time and place
       as required by § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Otherwise,
       there would be no time or place to “change or
       postpon[e].”

138 S. Ct. at 2114. Justice Alito agreed, writing that
“[p]aragraph (2) undoubtedly assumes that notices to appear
will state the ‘time and place’ of the removal proceeding as
required by § 1229(a)(1).” Id. at 2127 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Meaning the Court reads paragraph (2) to mean what it says: it
only applies “in the case of any change or postponement.” 

(a)(2)(A).12


       12
         So do three circuits. See Laparra-Deleon v. Garland,

 (1st Cir. 2022) (“By concluding that ‘there
would be no time or place to “change or postpone”’ unless a
‘notice to appear’ under § 1229(a)(1) itself had set such a
‘time,’ Pereira necessarily reads ‘change’ in § 1229(a)(2) to
refer to ‘the substitution of one thing for another’ or ‘the
succession of one thing in place of another . . . .’” (cleaned up)




                               21
       Because the Justice Department never changed or
postponed Madrid-Mancia’s hearing, no written notice was
required under paragraph (2). See id. The government was,
however, obligated to give her proper notice under paragraph
(1). See id. § 1229(a)(1). Because it failed to fulfill this
obligation, it cannot establish “by clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence that the written notice was so provided.”


(citations omitted)); Singh v. Garland, 

(9th Cir. 2022) (“This text presupposes—and common sense
confirms—that the Notice to Appear provided in paragraph (1)
must have included a date and time because otherwise, a
‘change’ in the time or place is not possible.”), reh’g en banc
denied, 

 (9th Cir. 2022); Rodriguez v. Garland, 

 (5th Cir. 2021) (allowing relief following a
defective NTA under Niz-Chavez but not Pereira), reh’g en
banc denied, 

 (5th Cir. 2022) (Duncan, J.,
concurring in denial of en banc rehearing) (“The alien never
got an initial ‘time or place,’ so there was nothing to ‘change’
and any subsequently set ‘time or place’ wouldn’t be ‘new.’”).
The circuits splitting the other way have not evaluated the
ordinary meaning of “change” or “postponement” in paragraph
(2), nor have they analyzed the key passage in Pereira. See
Santos-Santos v. Barr, 

, 491–92 (6th Cir. 2019)
(“Although Santos-Santos may have met his burden in
showing that he did not receive a notice in accordance with
paragraph (1), he did not meet his burden to show lack of notice
in accordance with paragraph (2).”); Dacostagomez-Aguilar v.
Att’y Gen., 

, 1318 n.3 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[A]
paragraph (2) notice can inform a person of a ‘change or
postponement in the time and place’ of removal proceedings
even if the initial hearing information appeared in a follow-on
notice of hearing.”).




                              22


 § 1229a(b)(5)(A). Given the lack of proper notice, the
agency acted beyond its statutory authority when it ordered
Madrid-Mancia removed in absentia.

                               C.

       Changing tack, the Justice Department cites the no-
notice provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B) to suggest
Madrid-Mancia forfeited her right to any notice of the time or
place of her removal hearing. Or any notice at all because the
Department reads § 1229a(b)(5)(B) to impose “a statutory
duty” on aliens to keep their “current address on file with the
immigration court.” Response Br. 2 (emphasis added). So, the
Department concludes, since Madrid-Mancia moved from the
address she provided at the border, she lost any right to further
information about her removal. That conclusion finds not a bit
of support in the text.

        Here is what the no-notice provision says: “[n]o written
notice shall be required” under the removal provision “if the
alien has failed to provide the address required under section
1229(a)(1)(F) of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B). So we
look to that cross-reference which requires “an address . . . at
which the alien may be contacted respecting proceedings.” Id.
§ 1229(a)(1)(F)(i). Meaning, once again, the Justice
Department swapped out the words written by Congress for
language it prefers. Thankfully for aliens and citizens alike,
that is not the way our Republic works.

      Because, of course, “an address” does not necessarily
mean the alien’s current residential address. See Renaut v.
Lynch, 

 (1st Cir. 2015) (“It is also not
apparent to us why the BIA (and the government in its briefing)
assume ‘address’ means residential address.”). “An address”




                               23
where the alien “may be contacted” means just that: a place
where a person can be contacted. The alien’s current residential
address. Or her cousin’s. Or a PO box. So long as that address
exists, it is sufficient. Cf., e.g., Dragomirescu v. Att’y Gen., 

 (11th Cir. 2022) (stale address with no
alternative); Gudiel-Villatoro v. Garland, 

(5th Cir. 2022) (no address ever provided); Spagnol-Bastos v.
Garland, 

 (5th Cir. 2021) (nonexistent
address).

        That is the case here. When she arrived in the United
States, Madrid-Mancia provided her cousin’s residence as “an
address . . . at which [she] may be contacted respecting
proceedings.” 

(a)(1)(F)(i). Then she moved
and tried to change her address with the agency. When that
failed, she continued using her cousin’s address, regularly
checking to see if she had received any immigration-related
mail. Cf. Santana Gonzalez v. Att’y Gen., 

, 279–
80 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating alien may be able to rebut
presumption of delivery where alien moved but had her “uncle,
his wife and son regularly sen[d] [her] mail that was addressed
to [her]”). All enough to make the no-notice provision
inapplicable.

                               III.

        The Justice Department prefers a system of notice to
aliens different from the law passed by Congress and signed by
the President. Perhaps its policy makes sense. No matter; “an
agency may not rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own
sense of how the statute should operate,” nor can it altogether
disregard Congress’s command. Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,

, 328 (2014). Because Madrid-Mancia’s in
absentia removal did not follow the law given by Congress, we




                                24
will grant her petition for review and remand for the agency to
rescind her removal order.




                              25