NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________

No. 22-2400 _______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ERIC SCOTT, Appellant _______________

On appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-19-cr-00565-001) District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg _______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on June 30, 2023

Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: July 10, 2023) _______________

OPINION * _______________

Krause, Circuit Judge.

On appeal of his resentencing for a conviction under

(g)(1),

Appellant Eric Scott asserts that the District Court’s imposition of a 19-month upward

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. variance from the applicable Sentencing Guideline range was substantively unreasonable.

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion, United

States v. Wise,

(3d Cir. 2008), and “will not disturb a trial court’s

exercise of discretion unless no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s view.”

United States v. Tomko,

(3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quotation marks and

citation omitted). Because we discern no abuse of discretion here, we will affirm.

I. DISCUSSION 1

A district court may depart from the applicable sentencing range prescribed by the

Guidelines if “the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance

of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing

Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from

that described.”

(b)(1). The decision to grant a variance must be

“premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant factors.” United

States v. Schweitzer,

(3d Cir. 2006).

In reviewing such a variance, we “may consider the extent of the deviation, but

must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a

whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall v. United States,

(2007).

As relevant here, those factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense, and

the history and characteristics of the defendant,

(a)(1), along with the

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under

. We have jurisdiction under

and

.

2 need for a sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,

provide for just punishment, adequately deter criminal conduct, and protect the public

from further crimes of the defendant.

(a)(2)(A)–(C).

Here, we cannot say the District Court abused its discretion by imposing an

upward variance. While Scott submits that the Court did not engage in “appropriate and

judicious consideration of the relevant factors,” Schweitzer,

, in actuality,

it evaluated the factors permissibly, if differently than Scott had hoped: it provided an

extensive explanation as to why the § 3553(a) factors warranted the variance despite

Scott’s assertion that he had changed, and it reasonably concluded that the protection of

the public also favored a greater sentence in view of Scott’s long history of criminal

offenses—two of which involved illegal weapons and endangered both civilians and law

enforcement officers.

While Scott contends the District Court failed to consider certain “other mitigating

points,” Opening Br. at 15, such as “the fact that all of Mr. Scott’s history has occurred

within a short window of time as a teenager/young adult, or that he will be, as counsel

noted, a father and a husband in his later 30’s upon release,” id. at 15–16, a district court

need not expressly address every assertion to demonstrate that it sufficiently “took the

[relevant] factors into account in sentencing,” United States v. Bungar,

(3d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted), and its decision “not to give such

mitigating factors the weight that [defendant] contends they deserve does not render [his]

3 sentence unreasonable,” United States v. Lessner,

(3d Cir. 2007); see

also Tomko,

.

Nor do we discern any abuse of discretion in the District Court’s choice to

reimpose Scott’s original sentence despite an intervening change in our interpretation of

the applicable Sentencing Guideline. 2 At resentencing, the District Court carefully

considered whether to exercise its discretion to impose a sentence above the revised

applicable range and determined that what it viewed as a legal technicality should not

undermine the incredibly violent nature of Scott’s prior Hobbs Act robbery, which

involved armed individuals going into a house and robbing a family in the presence of

very young minor children. Because “[t]he District Court gave specific reasons for why

[Scott’s] sentence varie[d] from the Guidelines range,” Tomko,

, and we

cannot say that “no reasonable person would adopt the [D]istrict [C]ourt’s view,”

, we see no error in the upward variance it imposed.

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

2 On appeal of Scott’s original sentence of 90 months, this Court concluded Scott’s prior Hobbs Act robbery conviction did not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the categorical approach, thus altering the applicable Guideline range. See United States v. Scott,

(3d Cir. 2021). Accordingly, we remanded for resentencing. 4