NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 22-2499 __________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

LORIE B. SHARPE, Appellant ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-02490) District Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) July 5, 2023

Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 20, 2023) ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

Lorie Sharpe appeals pro se from orders of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying her motion to dismiss and granting summary

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. judgment in favor of appellee. For the following reasons, we will affirm the District

Court’s judgment.

I.

From 2012 to 2016, Sharpe filed federal income tax returns that, upon an audit

conducted by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), overstated the amount of her income

tax withholding. The audit revealed that the IRS had erroneously issued Sharpe over

$450,000 in income tax refunds. In 2020, the Government filed an action in the District

Court seeking to reduce to judgment its tax assessments against Sharpe, recover the

erroneously paid refunds, and collect civil penalty assessments imposed on Sharpe for

filing frivolous returns. Sharpe filed a document denominated an answer and

subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the suit was barred by res judicata

and that, although she received actual notice of the action, she was not properly served.

The District Court denied Sharpe’s motion to dismiss. Upon completion of discovery,

the Government brought a motion for summary judgment; Sharpe did not file a response

in opposition. The District Court granted the Government’s motion for summary

judgment and entered a judgment in its favor.

II.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to

. We exercise plenary review

over the District Court’s denial of Sharpe’s motion to dismiss based on improper service

of process, see McCurdy v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery,

(3d Cir.

2 1998), and its grant of summary judgment, see Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist.,

(3d Cir. 2014). 1

III.

On appeal, Sharpe challenges the District Court’s denial of her improper service of

process defense. The District Court, however, correctly concluded that the Government

properly effectuated service of process by leaving a copy of the complaint and summons

with Sharpe’s 17-year-old son at the residence owned by Sharpe and at which she

received mail. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(B); see also Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am.

v. Brenneke,

(9th Cir. 2009) (“So long as a party receives sufficient

notice of the complaint, Rule 4 is to be liberally construed to uphold service.”) (quotation

marks omitted). The District Court therefore had personal jurisdiction over Sharpe. See

Lampe v. Xouth, Inc.,

(3d Cir. 1991).

To the extent that Sharpe challenges the District Court’s entry of summary

judgment in favor of the Government, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that

the Government submitted evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence, amount, and

date of each assessment, penalty, or overpayment. See

, 7405; Freck v.

IRS,

, 991 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994) (determining that assessments are presumed

valid and establish a prima facie case of tax liability). The Government presented

evidence that Sharpe received undue refunds totaling $452,803.89, was subject to penalty

1 Sharpe does not challenge the District Court’s denial of her motion to dismiss based on res judicata in her brief, and we accordingly do not reach that issue. See United States v. Pelullo,

(3d Cir. 2005). 3 assessments totaling $36,751.10, and owed unpaid taxes totaling $65,101.51, plus interest

and other statutory additions. Sharpe presented no persuasive evidence or argument that

she is not liable. Indeed, she did not challenge the correctness of the amounts due, see

United States v. Vespe,

, 1331 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that once the

Government establishes its case, the taxpayer then bears the burden of proving that he or

she is not liable for the assessments), and she has arguably forfeited any argument on

appeal by failing to meaningfully challenge the District Court’s order in her brief, see

supra n.1. Sharpe’s remaining contentions, which focus on the repossession of a vehicle,

are not germane to this appeal.

For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. The

Government’s motion to file a second supplemental appendix is granted.

4