NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-2008 __________

KAREN TUCKER, Appellant

v.

HP INC; ENRIQUE LORES, President and Chief Executive Officer, JON DOE(S) ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-03779) District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) August 2, 2023 Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 17, 2023)

___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se appellant Karen Tucker appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing

her amended complaint with prejudice. We will affirm.

In 2014, Tucker filed a products liability action against HP Inc. alleging that she

was burned and sustained an electrical shock from her HP laptop computer due to a

defective electrical cord. Ultimately, the District Court granted the defendant’s motion to

exclude Tucker’s proposed expert witness from testifying, and concomitantly awarded

summary judgment to the defendants in 2019. We affirmed the judgment on appeal.

Tucker v. Hewlett Packard, Inc.,

(3d Cir. Sept. 7, 2021).

Tucker returned to District Court in 2022 and filed a new complaint, contending

that documents she received in June 2020 from the U.S. Consumer Product Safety

Commission bolstered the claim in her product liability suit that her injuries were caused

by a defective power cord. After granting Tucker’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis,

the District Court determined that her new complaint made the same allegations as her

prior action against the same defendants, and that the prior case had resulted in a final

judgment. Accordingly, it dismissed Tucker’s complaint in Dist. Ct. Civ. No. 1:22-cv-

03779 without prejudice and with leave to file an amended complaint. See ECF No. 4.

Tucker filed an amended complaint, but the District Court concluded that it suffered from

the same defects as the first and dismissed it with prejudice. See ECF No. 8. Tucker

filed this timely appeal. 1

1 Tucker filed a motion for reconsideration in the District Court, which remains pending. 2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to

. We review de novo the

District Court’s application of the res judicata doctrine. See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard

Grp.,

(3d Cir. 2009). Res judicata or claim preclusion serves to avoid

piecemeal litigation and conserve judicial resources by requiring that parties present all

claims “arising out of the same occurrence in a single suit.” Blunt v. Lower Merion

School Dist.,

(3d Cir. 2014) (citations and brackets omitted). It

applies when the same parties have been involved in a prior lawsuit with a final judgment

on the merits and the plaintiff files a subsequent lawsuit based on the same cause of

action.

. It bars claims that were brought but also those that the plaintiff could

have brought. See

. When considering whether a cause of action is the same,

we focus on “the essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various

legal claims.”

(emphasis in original).

We agree with the District Court that Tucker’s recent action is barred. Tucker’s

action involves the same parties as her prior lawsuit in which the District Court ruled

against her on summary judgment. See Hubicki v. ACF Indus., Inc.,

, 524

(3d Cir. 1973) (summary judgment is a final judgment for res judicata purposes). As her

pleadings in the District Court and her brief on appeal reflect, Tucker continues to argue

that she was entitled to recover damages from HP for injuries she sustained in 2014, and

she maintains that the Court should have allowed her expert witness to testify. See, e.g.,

Appellant’s Informal Br. at 5 (describing interactions with HP in 2013 and her theory of

causation for 2014 injuries). The addition of a claim under the state consumer fraud

3 statute to her products liability claim does not change the application of claim preclusion

here: the underlying events that would purportedly give rise to a consumer fraud claim

are essentially the same as the ones asserted in support of her products liability claim.

See Blunt,

(citing Elkadrawy,

(3d Cir. 2009) (“This

analysis does not depend on the specific legal theory invoked, but rather [on] the essential

similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.”)). 2

Tucker contends that her 2020 receipt of materials from the U.S. Consumer

Products and Safety Commission documenting the 2014 recall of HP power cords

constitutes a new event for res judicata purposes. See Morgan v. Covington Twp.,

(3d Cir. 2011) (res judicata does not apply to events that post-date the

initial complaint). But as the District Court pointed out, those materials did not bring

forth anything new and merely confirmed what had been made plain during discovery in

her first case. See Dist. Ct. Order at 2 (noting that discovery established that HP

conducted a voluntary recall and replacement of power cords in 2014 because they could

pose a risk of fire or burn hazards). Tucker’s 2020 receipt of those documents does not

constitute a new event and cannot help her avoid the application of claim preclusion in

this case.

2 “Essential similarity” depends on “whether the acts complained of were the same, whether the material facts alleged in each suit were the same, and whether the witnesses and documentation required to prove such allegations were the same.” Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp.,

(3d Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Althone Indus.,

, 984 (3d Cir. 1984)). 4 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Tucker’s amended

complaint with prejudice.

5