NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________

No. 22-3121 ____________

YANKEES ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS NETWORK, LLC, Appellant

v.

HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY ____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (D.C. Civil No. 1:22-cv-00622) District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews ____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 6, 2023 ____________

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 27, 2023) ____________

OPINION * ____________

FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.

Yankees Entertainment and Sports Network (“YES”) sued Hartford Fire Insurance

Company (“Hartford”) over a coverage dispute. The United States District Court for the

District of Delaware dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction because the

lawsuit did not arise from any actions Hartford took in Delaware. We will affirm.

I

We write primarily for the parties and recount only the facts most important to our

decision. Briefly, YES is a New York regional sports television network that primarily

serves New York, though its streaming viewership spans the United States. It was

formed in Delaware as a limited liability company and has its headquarters and principal

place of business in New York.

YES purchased an insurance policy for business interruption coverage from

Hartford, which operates principally out of Connecticut. The policy was not negotiated

in Delaware and does not cover losses to any property in Delaware.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, YES filed a claim under the policy and Hartford

denied coverage. YES then sued in Delaware Superior Court, alleging breach of contract

and seeking a declaratory judgment that Hartford had a duty to provide coverage.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2 Hartford removed the case to federal court and then moved to dismiss the operative

complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The District Court granted the motion to

dismiss, and YES timely appealed.

II 1

We review dismissals for lack of jurisdiction de novo. Pinker v. Roche Holdings

Ltd.,

(3d Cir. 2002). In doing so, we must accept as true all factual

allegations in the complaint and construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.

We

review a district court’s decision to deny jurisdictional discovery for abuse of discretion.

Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A.,

(3d Cir. 2003).

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant must be authorized by state

law and “not violate the outer limits permissible under the [United States] Constitution.”

Fischer v. Fed. Express Corp.,

(3d Cir. 2022). Here, we look to

Delaware law to determine whether the District Court may exercise jurisdiction over

Hartford. Under Delaware law, YES has the burden of showing that jurisdiction is

authorized under Delaware’s long-arm statute. AeroGlobal Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Cirrus

Indus., Inc.,

(Del. 2005). YES fails to satisfy Delaware’s long-arm

statute, so we need not reach whether it meets constitutional requirements.

YES argues that Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(6) of Delaware’s long-arm statute,

10 Del. C. § 3104, confer personal jurisdiction over Hartford. As we explain below,

the Subsection (c)(1) argument fails, and YES forfeited its Subsection (c)(6) argument.

1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under

(a), and we have appellate jurisdiction under

. 3 Subsection (c)(1) gives Delaware courts jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

who “[t]ransacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State”

and where the plaintiff’s cause of action “aris[es] from” that conduct.

(c)(1). YES argues that Subsection (c)(1) reaches Hartford’s activities because

it “entered into countless contractual relationships with Delaware entities.” Appellant’s

Br. at 25. But Hartford’s relationships with Delaware entities unrelated to this action are

not the basis for YES’s claims, so they do not satisfy Subsection (c)(1). See LaNuova D

& B, S.p.A. v. Bowe Co.,

(Del. 1986) (“Where personal jurisdiction is

asserted on a transactional basis [under Subsection (c)(1)], . . . a single transaction is

sufficient if the claim has its origin in the asserted transaction.” (emphasis added)).

Hartford’s other contacts with Delaware are insufficient for similar reasons.

Although Hartford secured a license to sell insurance policies in Delaware, it did not sell

insurance to YES in Delaware. And although Hartford has been a party to prior court

cases in Delaware, see Gould v. Gould, Civil Action No. 3332-VCP,

, at

*8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 2011) (filing a lawsuit in Delaware may constitute “transacting

business” under Subsection (c)(1)), this lawsuit does not arise from that prior litigation.

In sum, YES was not a party to any of Hartford’s prior court cases in Delaware, and YES

has not demonstrated that the facts of those prior cases relate to this lawsuit. Mere

factual or legal similarities between cases do not establish that YES’s lawsuit “arose

from” prior lawsuits between Hartford and other parties. See LaNuova,

;

see also Uribe v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund,

(Table),

, at *4

(Del. 2015) (unpublished disposition) (affirming dismissal for lack of personal

4 jurisdiction where the plaintiffs’ claim did not derive from the nonresident defendant’s

filing of “unrelated lawsuits” in Delaware). So Subsection (c)(1) cannot be the basis for

personal jurisdiction over Hartford. 2

And YES did not rely on Subsection (c)(6) as basis for personal jurisdiction while

this matter was in the District Court. See

(c)(6) (permitting

courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who “[c]ontracts to insure . . .

any person . . . located . . . within the State at the time the contract is made”). When

Hartford moved to dismiss the complaint, it argued that Subsection (c)(6) could not serve

as a basis for personal jurisdiction. YES acknowledged Hartford’s argument in its

opposing brief but made no attempt to refute it. Instead, it stated that “10 Del. C.

§ 3104(c)(6) is just another way, not the only way, for Delaware to exercise personal

jurisdiction over an insurance company.” App. 307. And its entire argument about

personal jurisdiction was based on Subsection (c)(1). App. 306–08; see also App. 339–

40 (Hartford’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss) (“YES effectively concedes

that Section 3104(c)(6) of Delaware’s long-arm statute does not provide a basis to

exercise jurisdiction over Hartford, as it offers no response to Hartford’s arguments with

respect to that provision.”). Because YES did not present a Subsection (c)(6) argument to

2 YES argues that the District Court conflated specific and general personal jurisdiction. We disagree. The District Court analyzed specific personal jurisdiction when it asked whether the claims in question “‘aris[e] from’ [Hartford’s] transaction of business.” Yankees Ent. & Sports Network, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,

, 209 (D. Del. 2022) (quoting

(c)(1)); see also Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,

, 436–37 (3d Cir. 1987) (defining specific jurisdiction). 5 the District Court, it is forfeited on appeal. Premier Comp Sols., LLC v. UPMC,

(3d Cir. 2020).

Finally, YES appeals from the District Court’s denial of its request to conduct

jurisdictional discovery. But YES sought leave to conduct discovery about issues that

have no bearing on whether its claims “aris[e] from” Hartford’s conduct in Delaware.

Del. Code Ann., tit. 10, § 3104(c)(1). So the District Court’s decision was well within its

discretion.

***

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.

6