Jose Torres v.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Jose Torres v.

Opinion

ALD-213 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-2568 ___________

In re: JOSE TORRES Petitioner ____________________________________

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (Related to D.C. No. 2:20-cr-00418-001) District Judge: Honorable Brian R. Martinotti ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. on September 14, 2023

Before: HARDIMAN, RESTREPO, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 29, 2023) ____________________________________ ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

Pro se petitioner Jose Torres is currently awaiting trial in the District Court on multi-

ple counts of knowingly coercing and enticing individuals to travel in interstate com-

merce to engage in prostitution and other sexual activities, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2422

(a). In June 2023, he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court chal-

lenging the District Court’s adjudication of various pretrial motions, including his mo-

tions to disqualify the prosecutor and to proceed pro se. 1 We denied the petition, explain-

ing that (1) he had not shown that his right to a writ overriding the District Court’s denial

of the motion to disqualify was clear and indisputable, and (2) he could obtain review of

the District Court’s order denying self-representation following final judgment. In re:

Jose Torres, No. 23-2085,

2023 WL 4540470

, at *2 (3d Cir. Jul. 14, 2023) (per curiam)

(not precedential). We further explained that to the extent that Torres asked us to

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 In February 2023, the District Court permitted Torres to proceed pro se with standby counsel, directed him to submit all pro se filings to chambers for screening, and ap- pointed a special master to screen his pro se filings. The District Court subsequently re- versed its order in light of the volume of Torres’s submissions, his failure to abide by the applicable rules, and the delays he caused to the proceedings. Through counsel, Torres filed a notice of appeal as to that order; that appeal is pending in this Court. C.A. No. 23- 1913.

2 reassign the case to a different district judge, he had not shown that the District Judge in

his matter was biased or impartial.

Id. at *3

.

Torres has filed a second mandamus petition asking us to disqualify the District

Judge. He asserts that the District Judge’s unlawful and unconstitutional rulings manifest

bias and partiality. Specifically, he contends that the District Judge acted with bias by re-

fusing to grant him bail and denying his motion to disqualify the prosecutor; failing to

dismiss the second superseding indictment on the ground that Torres is “a ‘john’ and not

a sex trafficker,” Pet. 20, ECF No. 1-1; ruling that the Government is permitted to intro-

duce at trial “manufactured and false allegations of violence,”

id. 21

; relying on false

statements and facts to “muzzle” Torres by revoking his pro se status,

id. 22

; and tamper-

ing with his criminal docket sheet by striking fifteen of his pro se motions. Based on

these allegations, Torres asks us to disqualify the District Judge, reassign the criminal

case to a district judge in a different venue, and stay the criminal proceedings pending our

ruling.

A writ of mandamus is a “drastic remedy” that may be granted “only in

extraordinary circumstances in response to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of

power.” In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.,

418 F.3d 372

, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation

omitted). “Before a writ of mandamus may issue, a party must establish that (1) no other

adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of

the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the

circumstances.” Hollingsworth v. Perry,

558 U.S. 183, 190

(2010) (per curiam) (altera-

tion in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

3 Torres’s dissatisfaction with the District Judge overseeing his criminal case is

based solely on his disagreement with the judge’s decisions and his speculation that the

judge harbors bias against him, which are not sufficient bases for mandamus relief. “We

have repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an ade-

quate basis for recusal.” Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc.,

224 F.3d 273, 278

(3d Cir. 2000); see also Liteky v. United States,

510 U.S. 540, 555

(1994) (“[J]udi-

cial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”).

Recusal is also not required when based on mere “possibilities” and “unsubstantiated al-

legations.” 2 United States v. Martorano,

866 F.2d 62, 68

(3d Cir. 1989).

Accordingly, we will deny the mandamus petition. Torres’s motion to stay the

criminal proceedings pending our adjudication of the petition is also denied.

2 Torres also objects to the District Court’s rulings, especially the Court’s refusal to per- mit him to proceed pro se. However, as we previously explained, Torres is not entitled to mandamus relief as to this ruling because he can challenge it on direct appeal. See In re Torres,

2023 WL 4540470

, at *2. 4

Reference

Status
Unpublished