NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________

No. 20-3524 ___________

LORELIE HARTWELL, as Personal Representative of Lawrence Saffeels, Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 4-20-cv-01832) District Judge: Hon. Matthew W. Brann ____________

Argued on September 6, 2023

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: October 2, 2023)

Xiao Wang [Argued] University of Virginia School of Law 580 Massie Road Charlottesville, VA 22903 Counsel for Appellant

Michael J. Butler [Argued] Joseph J. Terz Office of United States Attorney Middle District of Pennsylvania Sylvia H. Rambo United States Courthouse 1501 N 6th Street, 2nd Floor P.O. Box 202 Harrisburg, PA 17102 Counsel for Appellee

____________

OPINION* ____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

Lorelie Hartwell, as personal representative of her brother, Lawrence A. Saffeels,

appeals the District Court’s order dismissing Saffeels’s habeas corpus petition as moot.

We will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I

Saffeels was serving a state prison sentence in 1991 when he was convicted in

federal court of firearms charges and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. That

judgment of sentence gave Saffeels 153 days of credit for time he served between his

arrest and sentencing. Following developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence, the

sentencing court later resentenced Saffeels to 300 months’ imprisonment, but the revised

judgment did not mention the 153-day credit.

In 2019, Saffeels asked the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to apply the credit to his

sentence, but the BOP denied his request. After exhausting his administrative remedies,

Saffeels filed a habeas petition with the District Court under

seeking

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

2 application of the credit and release on November 25, 2020. While his habeas petition

was pending before the District Court, Saffeels’s sentencing court notified the BOP that

his federal and state prison sentences were to run concurrently rather than consecutively.

This led the BOP to release Saffeels on November 10, 2020, fifteen days prior to the date

he requested in his habeas petition. Saffeels began a five-year term of supervised release

upon leaving federal prison.

The Government claimed that Saffeels’s release from custody rendered his case

moot. The District Court agreed with the Government, holding that Saffeels’s release

eliminated any possible relief under § 2241. Saffeels timely appealed the District Court’s

order and we appointed him pro bono counsel,1 but he passed away during the pendency

of this appeal, so Hartwell was substituted in his stead.

II2

When Saffeels filed his notice of appeal, we had jurisdiction under

to review the District Court’s order dismissing his petition as moot. Ruocchio v.

United Transp. Union, Loc. 60,

, 382 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1999). But things

changed when Saffeels died. “Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may

adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp.,

(1990). We lack jurisdiction if there is no relief available to an injured

1 We are grateful to the students of the Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law’s Appellate Advocacy Center and their director, Xiao Wang, for their able representation of Saffeels and Hartwell. 2 The District Court had jurisdiction over Saffeels’s habeas petition under

and 2241. 3 party or if the outcome of a case will not affect the litigants’ rights.

The purpose of a

petition for writ of habeas corpus is release from custody. Preiser v. Rodriguez,

(1973). But a prisoner who dies is no longer in government custody. See, e.g.,

Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz,

(3d Cir. 2013).

Notwithstanding Saffeels’s death, Hartwell argues that his estate may be entitled

to damages for time he wrongfully spent in prison. We express no opinion on that

argument, except to say it is not a collateral consequence that supports maintaining this

habeas action. See Spencer v. Kemna,

(1998) (rejecting the argument that

a speculative future monetary damages claim is relevant when determining if a habeas

claim is moot). Saffeels sought only an earlier release from custody based on the time-

served credit. That remedy can no longer benefit Saffeels or Hartwell, so the appeal is

moot.

Contrary to Hartwell’s argument, our decision in Keitel does not undermine our

decision today. In that case, a habeas petitioner died while his appeal was pending, and

we vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as

moot. But we did so after the district court had ruled against the petitioner on the merits.

729 F.3d at 279–80. That appeal’s procedural posture dictated that disposition. See, e.g.,

Cnty. of Butler v. Governor of Pa.,

, 231–32 (3d Cir. 2021). Unlike in Keitel,

here the District Court dismissed Saffeels’s petition as moot without deciding the merits.

It thus makes little sense for us to vacate and remand with instructions to the District

Court to do again what it already did. So we will dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction.

4