NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-1363 __________

SHEILA MARIE EYAJAN, Appellant

v.

ASHTABULA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER, et al 1-100 __________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-22-cv-00369) District Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) August 23, 2023

Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 16, 2023) ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Sheila Marie Eyajan appeals from the dismissal of her complaint. We will affirm.

I.

Eyajan filed this suit against the Public Defender for Ashtabula County, Ohio.

She alleged that the Public Defender represents her in a criminal action, which she did

not identify but which appears to be an Ohio state prosecution for aggravated menacing

and resisting arrest. According to Eyajan, the Public Defender filed a motion seeking a

determination of her mental competence and asserted that she has a history of mental

illness. Eyajan claims that the motion was wrongful because it is not supported by any

medical evidence and because the Public Defender filed it without her consent.

On the basis of those allegations, Eyajan asserted causes of action that she

identified as: (1) “defamation of character using both libel and slander”; (2) “breach of

contract attorney client privilege”; (3) “ineffective assistance of counsel”; and (4) “bias

and prejudice.” For relief, she requested removal of the Public Defender from her case,

withdrawal of the competency motion, and monetary damages. She also moved for leave

to proceed in forma pauperis.

The District Court granted Eyajan’s IFP motion, screened her complaint, and

dismissed it for failure to state a claim.1 The court construed Eyajan’s complaint as one

1 The court stated that it screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed it under § 1915A(b)(2). Section 1915A applies only to complaints filed by a “prisoner,” and it is not clear that Eyajan is a prisoner for that purpose, but even if she is not the screening and dismissal were authorized by

(e)(2)(B)(ii). 2 under

and dismissed it on the ground that the Public Defender is not a

state actor for § 1983 purposes. The court also explained that it lacks jurisdiction to order

the removal of the Public Defender and the withdrawal of the competency motion in

Eyajan’s state-court criminal action. Finally, the court concluded that leave to amend

was not warranted because amendment would be futile. Eyajan appeals.2

II.

In her complaint, Eyajan (who resides in Pennsylvania) purported to invoke the

District Court’s diversity jurisdiction rather than its federal question jurisdiction. But on

appeal, she does not contest the court’s characterization of her claims as federal claims

arising under § 1983. To the contrary, she argues that the court erred in dismissing her

complaint because the Public Defender violated her constitutional rights and did so under

color of state law. Thus, we agree that her claims should be construed as federal claims

arising under § 1983. We further agree that the dismissal of those claims was warranted

because “a public defender does not act under color of state law [for § 1983 purposes]

when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal

2 We have jurisdiction under

. We exercise plenary review over dismissals for failure to state a claim and apply the standard that governs dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Allah v. Seiverling,

(3d Cir. 2000). Under that standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Talley v. Wetzel,

, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). We construe pro se complaints liberally, see

but “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim,” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,

(3d Cir. 2013). We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. See Talley,

n.6. 3 proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson,

(1981); see also Bourdon v.

Loughren,

(2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that, in light of Polk County, “an

ineffectiveness [of counsel] cause of action would be inappropriate in a proceeding

brought under § 1983”).3

Eyajan also does not contest the District Court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to

supervise her state-court criminal proceeding, and we see no basis for the court to have

done so under the circumstances alleged here. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Kaye,

(2d Cir. 2006) (collecting cases). Finally, Eyajan does not argue that the court

erred in denying her leave to amend or that she could amend her complaint to state any

plausible claim if given that chance. To the contrary, her brief on appeal tends only to

confirm the court’s ruling that amendment would be futile.4 We thus cannot say that the

court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend.

III.

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

3 To the extent that Eyajan may have intended to assert state-law claims, she has abandoned them by not asserting them in her brief. 4 Eyajan devotes much of her brief to arguing the merits of the criminal charges against her. The proper place for those arguments, and for Eyajan’s complaints about the Public Defender generally, is in her criminal proceeding. We express no opinion on the merits of these issues. 4