NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-2320 ___________

THOMAS I. GAGE, Appellant

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, NA AS; FRANK J. PROVENZANO, Somerset County Sheriff ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00862) District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on November 1, 2023

Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 2, 2023) ____________________________________ ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

Pro se Appellant Thomas Gage appeals from the District Court’s order denying his

motion to set aside the District Court’s prior judgment on the basis of fraud on the court.

For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 1

I.

In 2011, Gage filed a pro se civil action in federal court challenging the foreclo-

sure and subsequent sale of a residential property. In brief, after Gage defaulted on his

mortgage, Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure complaint in state court. A final judgment of

foreclosure was entered by the state court in April 2010, and the property was sold pursu-

ant to a Sheriff’s sale in July 2010. In August 2011, after refusing to vacate the property,

Gage and his family were evicted pursuant to a writ of possession.

The District Court dismissed the complaint as to Wells Fargo, concluding that

Gage’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 2 The District Court granted

summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Frank Provenzano, finding that he was entitled to

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 This appeal was considered on Appellant’s brief. In light of our disposition, Appellee Frank Provenzano’s motion for an extension of time in which to file a responsive brief is DENIED as unnecessary. 2 See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co.,

(1923); D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman,

(1983). Pursuant to this doctrine, federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdic- tion to engage in appellate review of state court determinations. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP,

(3d Cir. 2010). 2 qualified immunity on Gage’s remaining claims relating to the enforcement of the fore-

closure judgment and subsequent sale of the property. We affirmed the District Court’s

judgment. See Gage v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA AS,

(3d Cir. 2013) (per

curiam). Since that time, Gage has filed multiple lawsuits stemming from the foreclosure

and sale of his former property.

In January 2023, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3), Gage filed a

motion to vacate the District Court’s judgment on the grounds of fraud on the court. In

support thereof, Gage asserted that the attorneys for Wells Fargo and Provenzano, as well

as Sheriff’s Sales Coordinator Thomas Pizybyiski, defrauded the District Court by fabri-

cating and filing “bogus” and “forged” documents, including a sheriff’s deed and writ of

execution, “to justif[y] their crime and to misle[a]d the court.” D.Ct. ECF No. 50 at 6.

Gage asserted that the District Court’s orders are therefore null and void, as they were

“based on an alleged state judiciary proceeding that never took place in the state court as

proved by the fabricated evidence[].” Id. at 5.

In support of his allegations of fraud and forgery, Gage asserted that the writ of

execution, see D.Ct. ECF No. 50-2 at 14, was never signed by the state court judge. As

to the sheriff’s deed, Gage stated that two such deeds existed when there should only be

one, and that a comparison of the signatures on the deeds with other known signatures of

the signatories proved that the deeds were fraudulent. The District Court denied the mo-

tion, finding Gage’s largely conclusory allegations to be insufficient to establish fraud on

the court. See D.Ct. ECF No. 52. Gage appeals.

II.

3 We have jurisdiction pursuant to

. We exercise plenary review of

any legal questions, and we review the District Court’s decision to deny relief for abuse

of discretion. Cf. In re Bressman,

(3d Cir. 2017) (on appeal from the

district court of a bankruptcy court decision on a motion to reopen and vacate based on

allegations of fraud on the court). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.

See Murray v. Bledsoe,

(3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3), a district court “may

set aside a judgment based upon its finding of fraud on the court when an officer of the

court has engaged in ‘egregious misconduct,’” such as bribery or fabrication of evidence.

In re Bressman,

(quoting Herring v. United States,

(3d

Cir. 2005)). Such a finding “must be supported by clear, unequivocal and convincing ev-

idence” of “(1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the court; (3) which is directed at

the court itself; and (4) in fact deceives the court.” Herring, 424 F.3d at 386–87 (citation

omitted).

In support of his appeal, Gage reiterates the arguments made before the District

Court, including his contentions that the judicial foreclosure proceedings and writs of ex-

ecution and possession were fabricated. We agree with the District Court that Gage has

not met the “demanding standard” required for the relief he seeks.

. Gage’s as-

sertion that a collection of signatures from various individuals appear to him to be notice-

ably different between documents is simply insufficient to constitute clear and convinc-

ing evidence of a forgery, much less that the alleged forgeries were specifically directed

at the District Court itself or were undertaken by the defendants or their attorneys with

4 the intent to deceive the District Court.

Nor is the lack of signature by the state court judge on the writ of execution, or the

presence of an electronic or stamped signature on other documents, evidence of forgery

or fraud. The challenged writs of execution and possession contain the seal of the court

and were issued by the court clerk’s office. See D.Ct. ECF No. 50-2 at 14, 19-23. Fur-

ther, Gage’s assertion that there were two sheriff’s deeds is not supported by the record.

As noted by the District Court, the alleged second deed was merely a duplicate of the

original that was submitted to prove it was filed with the clerk’s office. To the extent that

two writs of possession were issued, Gage has not shown that this is evidence of fraud.

Finally, Gage also has not shown that the underlying state court foreclosure proceedings

never took place.

Accordingly, we will affirm.

5