NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-2589 ___________

IN RE: PASCAL GEDEON, Petitioner ____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Related to No. 2:21-cr-00210-001) ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. on October 5, 2023

Before: BIBAS, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 6, 2023) ____________________________________ ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

Pascal Gedeon, proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus con-

cerning the ongoing criminal case against him in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

On May 20, 2021, a grand jury indicted Gedeon, charging him with the distribu-

tion and attempted distribution of child pornography, in violation of

(a)(2) and (b)(1). Gedeon has filed numerous motions in the District Court seeking

various forms of relief including requests for, inter alia, recusal, the end of dilatory prac-

tices, dismissal of the indictment, suppression of evidence, and pretrial release. The Dis-

trict Court denied Gedeon’s requests. Since his indictment, the trial date has been contin-

ued several times and is currently scheduled for November 11, 2023.

On September 1, 2023, Gedeon filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. 3d Cir.

ECF No. 1. He thereafter filed a motion for leave to amend his petition, a motion for a

speedy hearing, and an amended mandamus petition. Dkt Nos. 9–11. In his amended pe-

tition, Gedeon requests the recusal of Judge Pratter, who presides over the criminal mat-

ter, alleging that she has failed to properly adjudicate the case. In support of his petition,

Gedeon claims that the District Court lacks jurisdiction over his case, which appears to be

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2 related to his claim based on the insufficiency of the indictment. Gedeon further claims

that his right to a speedy trial was violated, that his confession was coerced, that the war-

rants were defective and invalid, and that the statute under which he was charged is un-

constitutional. Finally, Gedeon requests that he be released and the indictment be dis-

missed.

We will deny Gedeon’s amended mandamus petition. A writ of mandamus is a

“drastic remedy” that may be granted “only in extraordinary circumstances in response to

an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of power.” In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.,

, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). “Before a writ of mandamus may issue, a party must

establish that (1) no other adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he desires, (2) the

party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropri-

ate under the circumstances.” See Hollingsworth v. Perry,

(2010) (per

curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Gedeon has not made this show-

ing.

Gedeon is not entitled to mandamus relief on his arguments regarding the District

Court’s jurisdiction, the sufficiency of the indictment, his right to a speedy trial, the legal-

ity of his confession, the legality of the warrants, and the constitutionality of the statute

under which he was charged because he can challenge the District Court’s rejection of

those claims on direct criminal appeal. Mandamus must not be used as a substitute for

appeal. See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd.,

(3d Cir. 2003); In re Diet

Drugs, 418 F.3d at 378–79.

3 To the extent that Gedeon’s argument regarding the alleged Speedy Trial violation

can be construed as an allegation for undue delay, we reject his claim. A writ of manda-

mus may be warranted where a district court’s “undue delay is tantamount to a failure to

exercise jurisdiction.” See Madden v. Myers,

(3d Cir. 1996). Here,

however, the record shows that Gedeon’s case has been progressing steadily, with no fail-

ure to exercise jurisdiction over the case as a whole.

Finally, Gedeon requests the recusal of District Judge Pratter. Although we may

consider on mandamus whether a District Judge is obligated to recuse under

, see In re Kensington, 353 F.3d at 219–20, Gedeon has not shown that he is entitled

to this relief. Instead, his complaints are based on ordinary judicial decision-making, and

we have repeatedly held that mere dissatisfaction with rulings do not warrant recusal.

See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc.,

(3d Cir. 2000).

Additionally, upon review of the record, we cannot say that a reasonable person would

conclude the District Judge’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned. See In re Ken-

sington, 368 F.3d at 220–21.

To the extent Gedeon seeks mandamus relief in his motion for a speedy hearing,

for the same reasons as above, it is denied.

Accordingly, we grant the motion seeking leave to file an amended petition, and

we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus as amended.

4