NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________

No. 22-3153 _______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JUSTIN McCONNELL, Appellant _______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-20-cr-00132-001) District Judge: Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan _______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on October 23, 2023

Before: KRAUSE, FREEMAN, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

(Filed: November 9, 2023)

_______________

OPINION* _______________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Justin McConnell was convicted of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a

convicted felon, in violation of

(g)(1). On appeal, he argues that the District

Court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his home.

Discerning no error, we will affirm.

I. DISCUSSION1

While McConnell was on parole for a prior state sex offense involving a minor, a

team of parole agents conducted a warrantless search of his home after one of the agents

reported seeing McConnell with a child. During that search, the agents recovered a firearm

and ammunition. McConnell now challenges the District Court’s order denying his motion

to suppress that evidence.2 First, McConnell argues that the search violated his Fourth

Amendment rights because it was not supported by a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.

In the alternative, he argues that the search was unjustified because there was no nexus

between the agents’ suspicion of wrongdoing and his home. Neither argument is

persuasive.

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under

. We have jurisdiction under

. 2 McConnell reserved his right to appeal the District Court’s order by tendering a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2). We review the District Court’s denial of McConnell’s motion to suppress for clear error as to the Court’s factual findings, and we exercise plenary review over the application of the law to those facts. United States v. Golson,

(3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

2 A. Reasonable Suspicion

McConnell first claims that the agents’ search was not supported by reasonable

suspicion3 because it was based on a report that the District Court found to be “implausible”

at the suppression hearing. Opening Br. at 20. But the District Court did not discredit that

report in all respects. While it found certain allegations in the report “implausible,” the

Court credited the reporting agent’s claim that he “saw a child near Mr. McConnell in the

store,” whom the agent believed was “with” McConnell. United States v. McConnell, No.

20-cr-132,

, at *3 & n.5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2022). In denying

McConnell’s motion for reconsideration, the Court clarified that the reporting agent’s

credible observation “was that the child was with Mr. McConnell in a purposeful manner.”

United States v. McConnell, No. 20-cr-132,

, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Pa. Aug.

11, 2022).

These findings are sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing

because purposeful contact with a minor, standing alone, would violate the conditions of

McConnell’s parole, which prohibited him from having “any contact” with a minor,

including “nonverbal communication.” App. 141. So even when stripped to the portions

the District Court found credible, the parole agent’s report still created a reasonable

suspicion of wrongdoing. That is true even if the agent was ultimately mistaken about the

3 For a parolee like McConnell who has consented to searches of his home as a condition of his parole, “no more than reasonable suspicion” is required to justify a search. United States v. Williams,

(3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Knights,

(2001)).

3 relationship between McConnell and the child who appeared to be with him, because

reasonable suspicion does not require that an agent “be factually accurate in [his] belief

that a . . . law had been violated.” United States v. Delfin-Colina,

(3d

Cir. 2006). Instead, the agent “need only produce facts establishing that [he] reasonably

believed that a violation had taken place.”

That burden is satisfied here by the reporting

agent’s observations of McConnell near the child and his reasonable belief, as a result, that

McConnell had violated his parole conditions.

B. Nexus to the Home

McConnell next argues that, even if there was reasonable suspicion, there was no

nexus between that suspicion and his home. But we have observed that “direct evidence

linking the place to be searched to the crime is not required” even in the more demanding

context of probable cause. United States v. Hodge,

(3d Cir. 2001)

(alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Conley,

(3d Cir. 1993)).

Instead, courts are “entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely

to be kept[.]”

(quoting United States v. Whitner,

(3d Cir. 2000)).

And courts “may give considerable weight to the conclusions of experienced law

enforcement officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found.” Whitner,

(quoting United States v. Caicedo,

(6th Cir. 1996)).

Here, the parole agents who searched McConnell’s home were experienced law

enforcement officers who testified that, in their professional experience, evidence such as

children’s clothing, toys, games, books, dolls, and stuffed animals could be found in the

home of a person suspected of having purposeful contact with a child. The District Court

4 was entitled to rely on that professional experience to conclude that a search of

McConnell’s home was supported by reasonable suspicion. See Hodge,

(relying on the belief of an experienced police officer that the suspect’s home would

contain evidence related to drug activities); Whitner, 219 F.3d at 297–99 (same).

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm McConnell’s judgment of sentence.

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