Fawad Syed v. Warden Loretto FCI
Fawad Syed v. Warden Loretto FCI
Opinion
ALD-017 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 23-2490 ___________
FAWAD SHAH SYED, Appellant
v.
WARDEN LORETTO FCI ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-00122) District Judge: Honorable Stephanie L. Haines ____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 October 26, 2023 Before: HARDIMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed November 21, 2023) _________
OPINION* _________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Appellant Fawad Syed, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order
dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the
following reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.
In 2013, following a jury trial, Syed was convicted, in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia, of attempted online enticement of a minor,
destruction of records, and attempted destruction of records. He was sentenced to 294
months’ imprisonment. Syed appealed and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed his conviction. United States v. Syed,
616 F. App’x 973(11th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam), cert denied,
577 U.S. 1240(2016). Syed thereafter filed a motion to vacate
pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied by the District Court. Syed v. United
States, No. 117-036,
2018 WL 4494202(S.D. Ga. July 6, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted,
2018 WL 3738222(S.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2018).
On June 13, 2023, Syed filed a habeas petition pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Syed presented the
following claims: (1) insufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, (2) entrapment
which resulted in a due process violation, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. The
Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation recommending that the petition be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Syed objected. On August 9, 2023, the District Court
entered an order overruling Syed’s objections and dismissing the petition. Syed appeals.
2 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. In reviewing the
District Court’s dismissal of the § 2241 petition, we exercise plenary review over its legal
conclusions and review its factual findings for clear error. See Cradle v. United States ex
rel. Miner,
290 F.3d 536, 538(3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). We may summarily affirm a
District Court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record if the appeal does not
raise a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6; see also Murray v.
Bledsoe,
650 F.3d 246, 247(3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
The District Court correctly determined that Syed could not pursue his claims in a
§ 2241 petition. As recognized by the District Court, “[m]otions pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their
convictions or sentences” on constitutional grounds. Okereke v. United States,
307 F.3d 117, 120(3d Cir. 2002). Such claims may not be raised in a § 2241 petition, except
where the remedy under § 2255 would be “inadequate or ineffective.”
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Jones v. Hendrix,
599 U.S. 465, 475(2023) (discussing the saving clause).
Syed has not argued, much less demonstrated, that this exception applies.
Notably, he has not cited any “unusual circumstances mak[ing] it impossible or
impracticable to seek relief in the sentencing court.” Jones,
599 U.S. at 478.1 Rather, he
1 To the extent the District Court relied on the interpretation of the savings clause in In re Dorsainvil,
119 F.3d 245, 251–52 (3d Cir. 1997), that decision has been abrogated by Jones,
599 U.S. at 477.
3 presents claims that he either could have raised or did raise in his initial § 2255 motion or
on direct appeal. Although the limitations on second or successive § 2255 motions might
prevent him from raising the claims in a new § 2255 motion, that does not make § 2255
inadequate or ineffective. See Okereke,
307 F.3d at 120.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
4
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished