Deborah Grooms v. Ally Financial

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Deborah Grooms v. Ally Financial

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-2285 __________

DEBORAH GROOMS, Appellant

v.

ALLY FINANCIAL ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-01124) District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) November 22, 2023 Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 29, 2023) ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Deborah Grooms appeals pro se from an order of the District Court dismissing her

complaint pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(e)(2)(B)(ii). For the following reasons, we will

affirm.

In March 2023, Grooms filed a complaint against Ally Financial, alleging

violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),

15 U.S.C. § 1692

et seq.

Grooms alleged that, prior to filing the instant complaint, “Plaintiff and Defendant had

zero business transactions together.” Dkt No. 1 ¶ 3. She further alleged that on or about

December 2, 2022, she received correspondence from Ally Financial “regarding an

unverified alleged debt.”

Id. at ¶ 4

. Attached to her complaint, however, Grooms

submitted correspondence between herself and Ally Financial from as far back as July

2015, wherein Ally referred to Grooms as an “Ally customer” and which appears to

indicate that Ally financed Grooms’ purchase of a used vehicle.

Id. at 5

. Grooms also

submitted a letter from Ally, dated August 2, 2021, indicating that Grooms was late in

making her payments to Ally,

id. at 7

, and the December 2, 2022 letter from Ally,

indicating that Grooms’ last payment was made in May 2021, she had an outstanding

balance of $5,987.98, and that her account “was charged off as a Loss[,]”

id. at 6

.

On June 14, 2023, the District Court granted Grooms’ request to proceed in forma

pauperis and, pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), dismissed the complaint for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dkt No. 5. Specifically, the District Court

concluded that Grooms failed to adequately allege that Ally is debt collector and

therefore failed to state a claim under the FDCPA. Noting that amendment would be 2 futile, the District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice without providing an

opportunity for amendment. Grooms appeals.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1291

. Our review of the District

Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling,

229 F.3d 220, 223

(3d Cir. 2000). We review the District Court’s denial of leave to amend

for abuse of discretion, although we review de novo the determination that amendment

would be futile. U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P.,

769 F.3d 837, 849

(3d Cir. 2014).

To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) she is a

consumer; (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice

involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the Act defines it, and (4) the defendant has

violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.” Jensen v. Pressler

& Pressler,

791 F.3d 413, 417

(3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Douglass v. Convergent

Outsourcing,

765 F.3d 299, 303

(3d Cir. 2014)). Here, in particular, the District Court

concluded that Grooms failed to satisfy the second prong, that Ally was a debt collector

under the statute.

Pursuant to the FDCPA, a “debt collector” includes, as relevant here, (1) “any

business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts,” (2) any person

“who regularly collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due another,” and (3)

“any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than

his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect 3 such debts.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). We conclude that the District Court correctly held

that Grooms failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that Ally met the definition of

a debt collector under the statute. Most notably, Grooms’ allegations and exhibits

demonstrate that Ally’s communications concerned a debt owed to itself in connection

with financing Grooms’ car. 1 See Tepper v. Amos Fin., LLC,

898 F.3d 364, 366

(3d Cir.

2018).

Finally, we agree with the District Court’s determination that amendment would

be futile and therefore the District Court properly dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

The District Court also correctly noted that, although Grooms alleged that 1

“[b]efore this action was filed, Plaintiff and Defendant had zero business transactions together,” Dkt No. 1 at ¶ 3, the exhibits attached to her complaint contradicted her allegation and therefore need not be accepted as true. See Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n,

903 F.3d 100, 112

(3d Cir. 2018). 4

Reference

Status
Unpublished