Wesley-Keith Mullings v. Harriet Raghnal

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 24-2055 ___________

WESLEY-KEITH MULLINGS, Holder in due course of WESLEY KEITH MULLINGS and holder in due course of ISAIAH KEISHON MULLINGS, sui juris, and Trustee of

Wesley Keith Mullings Trust,

Appellant v.

HARRIET ELAINE RAGHNAL, Bar # 006762006; AISHA MARGARET SMITH; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; THOMAS JOSEPH WALSH, Bar # 033311990; LISA FRAN CHRYSTAL, Bar # 018081982; DAVID BRIAN KATZ, Bar # 021921987

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On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

(D.N.J. Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-01294 District Judge: Honorable Madeline C. Arleo ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on November 7, 2024 Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 25, 2024)

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___________ OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Wesley-Keith Mullings appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his claims regarding a custody dispute. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s decision.

I.

In March 2022, Mullings filed a complaint stemming from the legal custody and adop- tion proceedings by his ex-wife, Aisha Margaret Smith, for his now-adult son. He brought claims against Smith and Smith’s attorney Harriet Elaine Raghnal, as well as the State of New Jersey, Judge Lisa Fran Chrystal, Judge Thomas Joseph Walsh, and Judge David Brian Katz. These judges each made rulings in Mullings’s state court custody matter; Mullings claimed that their decisions were based on falsified documents by Smith and Raghnal. In an amended complaint, Mullings raised state law claims and claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986.

On a motion by the judges and the State, the District Court dismissed Mullings’s claims against them. Mullings appealed, but we dismissed his appeal for lack of appellate juris- diction because the District Court had not yet disposed of Mullings’s claims against Smith and Raghnal. See Mullings v. Raghnal, No. 23-2470 (order entered Jan. 4, 2024). Mullings then filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), seeking a default judgment. The District Court denied the motion to the extent that Mullings sought a default judgment and dismissed his remaining claims. Mullings timely appealed.

II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Mullings’s claims. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Gallas v. Sup. Ct., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). Dismissal is appropriate “if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that [the] plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011).

III.

We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Mullings’s claims. First, Mullings’s claims against the judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity, a ruling Mullings does not challenge in his appellate brief. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that any issue an appellant fails to develop in an opening brief is forfeited); see also Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took is in error, was done mali- ciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, Mullings does not challenge the District Court’s conclusion that his claims against the State are barred by sovereign immunity.1 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).

Mullings makes no arguments challenging the District Court’s dismissal of his remain- ing claims against Smith and Raghnal. In any event, he did not allege the existence of a contractual relationship with either defendant to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006). He also did not make factual allegations of racial or class-based discriminatory animus by these defendants to support a § 1985 or § 1986 claim.2 See Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2006); Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 1980).

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.