BLD-041 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-1754 ___________

JOEL GLASTON MUIR, Appellant

v.

JOHN E. WETZEL; MR. J. HALL; MR. J. FREEMAN; MR. D.K. SMITH; MR. C. FOREMAN; MR. W.L. JAMES; MR. THOMAS; MR. KNOX ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-04459) District Judge: Honorable Kai N. Scott ____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to

(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 November 26, 2024

Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 11, 2024)

_________

OPINION * _________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Joel Muir appeals the District Court’s order granting the Appellees’ motion for

summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District

Court’s order.

The procedural history of this case and the details of Muir’s claims are well known

to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s memorandum order, and need not be

discussed at length. Briefly, Muir, a Pennsylvania prisoner, claimed that a former prison

policy regarding how legal mail was handled violated his constitutional rights. After the

District Court dismissed Muir’s claims based on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,

Appellees moved for summary judgment on his remaining claim that his First

Amendment rights were violated. 1 The District Court concluded that Appellees were

entitled to summary judgment on that claim because Muir had not provided any evidence

that his legal mail was actually read. Muir filed a timely notice of appeal.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to

and exercise de novo review

over the District Court’s order granting summary judgment. See Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of

Corr.,

(3d Cir. 2011). A party moving for summary judgment must

show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To determine whether the movant

has satisfied this burden, “we view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the

1 The District Court granted Appellees’ motion as unopposed, but, on appeal, we vacated the District Court’s order and granted Appellees’ motion to remand the matter. See C.A. No. 21-3145. 2 light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv.,

(3d Cir. 2017).

The now-discontinued legal mail policy provided that privileged mail would be

opened in front of the inmate and inspected for contraband. The mail would be

photocopied, and the copies given to the inmate. The mail would then be sealed in an

opaque envelope and secured with evidence tape before being deposited in a locked

receptacle. Prison officials did not have access to the receptacle; only a private vendor

did. The policy also provided that the processing of the privileged mail would be

recorded on video. Under the policy, an inmate could later request access to the sealed

mail which would then be opened in his presence again per the policy. An inmate could

also request that the privileged mail be retrieved and maintained in an evidence locker in

the security office. See Inmate Mail and Incoming Publications Policy, DC-ADM 803

(effective October 3, 2018-April 5, 2019).

In his brief, which we will consider as his opposition to possible summary action,

Muir argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for Appellees

because by turning over his privileged mail to a third-party, they breached his attorney-

client privilege without his consent. Muir cites to our decision in Jones v. Brown,

(3d Cir. 2006), to support his argument. In Jones, we concluded that a

temporary policy that allowed prison officials to open privileged mail outside the

presence of the inmate infringed on the inmates’ right to freedom of speech. We noted

that this practice chilled the inmates’ expression regardless of the prison officials’ claims

that they would not read the mail.

. Here, however, the privileged mail was

3 opened in Muir’s presence. See Wolff v. McDonnell,

(1974) (noting

that “[a]s to the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no way

constitute censorship, since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill such

communications, since the inmate’s presence insures that prison officials will not read the

mail”). Muir also contends that the Constitution obliges prison officials “to take

additional measures to ensure that legal mail remains unread.” See Fontroy v. Beard,

(3d Cir. 2009). Here, the prison officials did take such additional

measures: the mail was sealed and secured in a locked container.

Muir appears to be arguing that his First Amendment right to communicate was

chilled by the storage of the privileged mail outside of his presence by a private vendor.

As noted above, however, after being copied, the privileged mail was sealed in an opaque

envelope and placed in a locked container. Muir has failed to submit any evidence that

his privileged mail could (or would) have been obtained from the third party by prison

officials and read after it was sealed and placed in the locked receptacle.

The District Court did not err in granting Appellees’ motion for summary

judgment. Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in

the appeal. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4. For the above reasons, as well as those set forth

by the District Court, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See Third

Circuit I.O.P. 10.6.

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